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Non-recurring congestion caused by incidents is a major source of traffic delay in
freeway systems. With the objective of reducing these traffic delays, traffic operation
managers are focusing on detecting incident conditions and dispatching emergency
management teams to the scene quickly. During the past few decades, a few number of
conventional algorithms and artificial neural network models were proposed to automate the
process of detecting incident conditions on freeways. These algorithms and models, known
as automatic incident detection methods (AIDM), have experienced a varying degree of
detection capability.
Of these AIDMs, artificial neural network-based approaches have illustrated better
detection performance than the conventional approaches such as filtering techniques, decision
tree method, and catastrophe theory. So far, a few neural network model structures have been
tested to detect freeway incidents. Since the freeway incidents directly affect the freeway
traffic flow, majority of these models have used only traffic flow variables as model inputs.
However, changes in traffic flow may also be stimulated by the other features (e.g., freeway
geometry) to a greater extent. Many AIDMs have also used a conventional detection rate as
a performance measure to assess the detection capability. Yet the principle function of
incident detection model, which is to identify whether an incident condition exists for a given
traffic pattern, is not measured in its entirety by this conventional measure.
In this study, new input feature sets, including freeway geometry information, were
proposed for freeway incident detection. Sixteen different artificial neural network (ANN)
models based on feed forward and recurrent architectures with a variety of input feature sets
were developed. ANN models with single and double hidden layers were investigated for
vii

incident detection performance. A modified form of a conventional detection rate was
introduced to capture full capability of AIDMs in detecting incident patterns in the freeway
traffic flow. Results of this study suggest that double hidden layer networks are better than
single hidden layer networks. The study has demonstrated the potential of ANNs to improve
the reliability using double layer networks when freeway geometric information is included
in the model.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1

Problem Definition
Traffic delay is a nightmare that every driver traveling on freeway systems may have

to experience. These traffic delays are an increasing burden on safety, economy, productivity,
and quality of life in countries across the world. Freeway traffic delay is a direct consequence
of congestion in the freeway system. In the U.S. alone, congestion has grown throughout the
1980s and early 1990s, leading to a reduction in overall freeway performance. In 1981, about
25% of urban interstate freeway-miles were classified as highly congested; by 1993, that
proportion had nearly doubled to 45% (ATA 1997). Though freeway congestion is a
nationwide problem in scope, it is heavily concentrated in the largest urban areas such as Los
Angeles, New York, San Francisco, Washington, D.C., Miami, Boston, Chicago etc. This
congestion is spreading to many smaller urban communities and even to some rural interstate
corridors.
Freeway congestion can be caused by either recurrent events or incidents (nonrecurrent events). The recurrent congestion, which can be predicted, is caused by high traffic
volumes using the freeway. Usually, high traffic volumes occur during morning and afternoon
commute hours, special event times, emergency evacuations, etc. Incident congestion,
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unpredictable in nature, is caused by events such as accidents, spilled loads, fallen debris,
stalled vehicles, etc. The congestion induced by an incident depends on the duration of the
incident, the number of closed lanes, and the traffic volume at the time.
The existing freeway systems are designed to operate acceptably within certain ranges
of traffic demand. When an unpredictable event occurs, traffic backs up and creates a sudden
and temporary decrease in the capacity of a particular section of the facility. As the demand
volume exceeds the temporarily reduced capacity, the excess demand volume creates queues
(traffic congestion), increases traffic delay, and develops a potential environment for more
accidents (Hall 1993). Whether the congestion is caused by recurrent or non-recurrent events,
traffic congestion leaves a noticeable footprint in the traffic flow. These footprints are
noticeable in traffic flow variables such as volume, speed, and occupancy (expressed as the
percent of time the vehicles occupied a particular location on a lane). Recurrent and incident
(non-recurrent) congestions create subtle yet distinctive signatures in the traffic flow
variables. At the onset of incident congestion, the capacity decrease is sudden and so is the
change in traffic flow. On the other hand, when recurrent congestion occurs, such as under
bottleneck conditions, the capacity decrease is gradual and so is the change in traffic flow.
Due to heavy traffic volume and limited access, incident induced congestion in a
freeway system is more severe and creates higher overall traffic delays than that of arterial and
other minor roadways. In 1984, almost 61% (766.8 million vehicle-hours) of urban freeway
delays were incident related, and this delay is expected to increase up to 70% (4,857.5 million
vehicle-hours) by year 2005 (Lindley 1987). Furthermore, the user cost of incident delay is
expected to increase from 5.6 to 35.8 billion dollars during this 22-year period. These
2

projections are even without accounting for the effect of emotional distress of drivers and
passengers that experience the traffic delays.
Freeway incident management systems provide a solution to the problem of incident
congestion through coordinated activities designed to reduce the impact of freeway incidents
on traffic flow. These incident management systems can provide several short-term and longterm benefits; minimize loss of time and productivity, reduction in fuel consumption, lower
vehicle operating costs, minimize degradation of air quality, reduction in the cost of delivering
goods, increase in highway safety, and increase in a region’s economic competitiveness and
quality of life. Accordingly, freeway incident management has become a top priority in Traffic
Management Centers (TMC) across the country.
It is a well-known fact that incidents can be better managed if they are identified
quickly. Therefore, identification of freeway incidents has become a vital characteristic of a
successful freeway traffic management system. Incident detection using manual methods, such
as probe vehicles, closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras, or special police patrol, can be
quite costly, time consuming, and labor intensive. To contend with these problems, recent
studies have focused on automating the incident detection process and by that reducing the
time and the labor required. In general, these automatic incident detection (AID) systems
utilize traffic data gathered from inductive loops buried under pavement. Signals from pairs
of these loops are used to estimate traffic flow variables such as volume, speed, and
occupancy. Historically, performance of AID systems has been measured by detection rate
(percentage of incidents detected) and false alarm rates (percentage of time that the AID
system detects nonexisting or false incident conditions).
3

Conventional AID systems developed over the past years have used different
techniques including decision trees for pattern recognition (Payne et al. 1978), Kalman filters
(Willsky et al. 1980), time series analysis (Ahmed and Cook 1982), catastrophe theory
(Persaud and Hall 1989), and low pass filters (Stephanedes and Chassiakos 1993). The
decision tree method (also known as California algorithm) introduced by Payne et al. (1978)
is based on discontinuity in occupancy values between two adjacent loop detector stations.
The algorithm has been developed in several different versions over the years. The California
algorithm No. 8 (Payne et al. 1978) has a five minute roll-wave suppression logic that aims
to reduce false incident detections due to shock waves approaching from downstream. It
consists of five threshold values to determine whether traffic conditions have changed. These
threshold values are predetermined with traffic data for which the traffic status (i.e., incident
free, incident present, compression waves downstream, etc.) at each time interval is known.
The algorithm can be first applied from a known traffic status at each freeway section. If a
significant discontinuity in occupancy is detected, the change in the traffic status initiates an
incident alarm. Several published literature have revealed that incident detection accuracy of
the California algorithm is very low (Payne et al. 1978; Arceneaux et al. 1989; Cheu and
Ritchie 1993). Moreover, the algorithm calibration is very lengthy and involves testing as
many as several thousands of threshold value combinations.
Willsky et al. (1980) used dynamic models to estimate traffic flow parameters that
may relate to incidents. The density and speed of freeway links were modeled in non-linear
differential equations. Segment (link) capacity was used as an incident detection parameter.
Using a Kalman filter, segment density and speed were estimated based on volume and
4

occupancy variables measured from loop detectors at both upstream and downstream ends
of each segment. An incident is detected by a reduction in link capacity which is calculated
from the speed equation.
Ahmed (1983) used a time series model to detect freeway incident conditions.
Parameters of the time series model were estimated from an autocorrelation of single detector
occupancies. The parameters are updated online. With a 95% confidence interval, occupancy
at the single detector station is predicted for the next detection interval. If the actual
occupancy falls outside the 95% confidence interval, an incident alarm is issued.
Persaud and Hall (1989) introduced catastrophe theory into freeway incident
detection. This incident detection method, also known as the McMaster algorithm, uses
volume and occupancy data from the fast lane of a loop detector station. The McMaster
algorithm consists of location specific volume-occupancy plots that classify traffic data points
into one of several areas. Incident congestion is detected if upstream and downstream traffic
data points fall into certain areas in the location specific plots. An incident alarm is declared
if incident congestion persisted for three consecutive intervals.
Low pass filtering algorithm (commonly known as the Minnesota algorithm) was used
in incident detection by Stephanedes and Chassiakos (1993). Traffic occupancy at two loop
stations were used with a short-term time averaging (or low pass filtering) to reduce adverse
effects of short-term traffic fluctuations and impulsive noise in the detection process. The
Minnesota algorithm traces the filtered spatial occupancy difference between adjacent
detector stations through time, and issues an incident alarm when this difference changes
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significantly in a short time. It uses one threshold value to detect traffic congestion and
another threshold value to detect the onset of incident congestion.
These conventional algorithms posses several shortcomings. For example, in order to
use the California algorithm No. 8 at a location, accurate traffic status should be known at the
beginning. Despite the fact that all three traffic variables (volume, speed, and occupancy) are
affected by incidents, the California and Minnesota algorithms use only occupancy related
variables as inputs and the McMaster algorithm use only volume and occupancy variables as
inputs. Another potential disadvantage of the McMaster algorithm is that it only uses traffic
variables from the fast lane. Modeling equations, such as those used by Willsky et al. (1980),
may not always be satisfactory in replicating traffic flow in actual situations (Cheu and Ritchie
1994). Most conventional algorithms (except the Minnesota algorithm) can only detect 4070% incidents occurring at low false alarm rates (0.01-0.90%). Simply put, despite
development of these several algorithms, the conventional AID models developed so far
posses low reliability levels (Stephanedes and Liu 1995). Consequently, traffic engineers are
reluctant to depend on such low reliable models for freeway operations. Therefore, reliability
and quick identification of incidents have become basic ingredients of a successful incident
detection model.
Artificial neural networks (ANNs) are good at trend prediction, pattern recognition,
modeling, control, signal filtering, noise reduction, image analysis, classification, evaluation
etc. (Lawrence 1993). In fact, new uses for artificial neural networks are being found in a
variety of research fields every day. However, every application of ANN shares the ability to
make associations between known inputs and outputs by observing many examples or
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patterns. Researchers in transportation engineering area have used artificial neural networks
since late 80's. The application attempts includes simulating driver behavior (Yang et al. 1992;
Dougherty and Joint 1992), estimating travel time (Nelson and Palacharla 1993; Hua and
Faghri 1994), classifying pavement distress from video images (Hua and Faghri 1993),
detecting vehicles from images (Mead et al. 1994; Belgaroui and Blosseville 1993), and
detecting incidents.
During this decade a smaller number of ANN models have been developed to
automate the freeway incident detection process. Wiederholt et al. (1993) developed two
single-station feed forward ANN models to detect incidents. Using a dynamic traffic
simulation model, traffic flow data for Highway 401 in Toronto, Canada were simulated. The
simulation was based on observed traffic patterns from the Toronto section of Highway 401
between 2pm and 3pm on June 8, 1992. The simulated traffic flow data (volume, speed, and
occupancy) averaged over all lanes at 20 second intervals during 61-hours were used as
model inputs. Both models had a single-hidden layer and a single neuron in the output layer.
The first model had link (section) number and traffic volume, speed, and occupancy variables
measured at current time intervals from single detector station as inputs. The second model
had the link number and the three traffic variables measured at current time intervals of up to
two previous time intervals from a single detector station as model inputs. Performance of
both models revealed an incident detection rate of 97% and a false alarm rate of 3%.
Cheu and Ritchie (1994) developed a two-station feed forward ANN model using
simulated traffic flow variables. The simulated traffic volume and occupancy values averaged
over all lanes during 30 second intervals were used in the model development. Only single
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hidden layer networks were tested by the authors. The best model had a detection rate of 80%
with a false alarm rate of 1.46% during an evaluation phase which also used simulated traffic
data that was different from training data.
Hsiao (1994) developed a feed forward ANN model combined with fuzzy logic to
detect freeway incidents. Traffic data collected at 14 loop detector stations on Highway 401
in Toronto, Canada in Spring 1993 was used in model training and evaluation. The traffic
volume, speed, and occupancy variables were collected at single loop detector stations and
averaged during 20 second intervals. These numeric input values were then translated into
three linguistic categories (‘low’, ‘medium’, and ‘high’) using fuzzy logic and used as ANN
model inputs. The author used the traffic data at current time intervals in the model. The best
model during training exhibited a detection rate of 76.19% with a false alarm rate of 8.05%.
Stephanedes and Liu (1995) developed a feed forward ANN model based on twostation traffic data. The traffic data were collected at 14 loop detector stations during a 72day period in 1989 in westbound I-35 in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Model inputs consisted of
traffic volume and occupancy data at 10 consecutive 30 second intervals at adjacent loop
stations. Randomly selected 425 traffic patterns (including both ‘incident free’ and ‘incident
present’ condition) were used in the training. The authors tested the model using traffic data,
part of which included the whole training data, collected during the 72-day period. The test
results indicated a detection rate of 70% to 80% with a false alarm rate of 0.12% to 0.26%.
Abdulhai and Ritchie (1995) used a modified probabilistic neural network (PNN)
approach to detect freeway incidents. Using the same simulated data set as in Cheu and
Ritchie’s (1993) study, the authors gained a detection rate of 100% with a false alarm rate of
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4.77%. In order to get good performance when the model was applied to a new location, the
model had to learn new traffic patterns during the implementation process.
The above mentioned ANN studies show an overall improvement in detection
performance over conventional algorithms such as the California, Mc Master, and Minnesota
algorithms. However, these studies still have some short comings. For example, the one hour
traffic pattern used in Wiederholt et al. (1993) study may not be a representative enough to
simulate the variety of traffic conditions that exist in a freeway system. Many of ANN-based
models described above (except the model developed by Stephanedes and Liu 1995) were
trained based on simulated traffic data. Cheu and Ritchie (1994) stated that experience has
shown that the modeling equations may not always satisfactorily replicate traffic flow in actual
situations leaving some concern over the estimated traffic flow variables using dynamic
modeling. Therefore, the performance of models developed using simulated traffic data may
contain some sampling bias. ANN models developed by Cheu and Ritchie (1994),
Stephanedes and Liu (1995), and Abdulhai and Ritchie (1995) used only two of the three
traffic variables as model inputs despite all three traffic variables are affected by incidents.
Following a historical trend, many ANN models still use a conventional detection rate that
may not truly reflect the capability of detecting individual incident patterns as described later
in this section. The majority of the ANN models illustrate that there is still some room for
improvement in performance. The incident detection models developed based on PNN have
its own disadvantages. Since a separate hidden layer neuron is required for separate input
patterns of each example in the training data set, the PNN models can become quite large.
Once trained, these PNN models take more time to run than back propagation networks
9

(Lawrence 1993). Furthermore, in problems such as incident detection with a large amount
of complex data, back propagation is more accurate (Specht and Shapiro 1991).
When an incident occurs on a freeway section, the traffic speed downstream of the
section increases while the traffic speed upstream of the section decreases. In contrast to the
change in speed, the downstream occupancy decreases while the upstream occupancy
increases due to the congestion created by the incident. Generally speaking, the ANN models
are trained to identify such changes from one geometric location to the other, learn hidden
relationships among traffic flow variables, and detect the onset and continuation of incidents.
For freeways, vehicles enter through entrance ramps and leave through exit ramps that change
the traffic flow. Changes in traffic flow from one end to the other end of a freeway segment
are also apparent when the freeway segment expands (adding one or more lanes) or contracts
(merging one or more lanes). Even under normal traffic conditions, then, change in laneage
and presence of entrance and exit ramps (or geometric variables) affect traffic flow
characteristics. In general, the ANN models are not station specific and a trained ANN model
is applied to freeway segments with variety of geometric features. It can be easily conceived,
therefore, the ANN models should be able to differentiate the changes in traffic flow between
upstream and downstream sections from those caused by changes in geometric features and
those caused by incidents alone. Should the ANN model has prior knowledge of the
geometric changes, it can recognize these recurrent congestion patterns from incident
congestion patterns and may reduce the false alarms. Therefore, these geometric variables
should be considered when developing incident detection models.
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Previous researchers have used a conventional ‘detection rate’ that assesses capability
of AID models in detecting the number of incidents from an incident database. Traffic data
at a predetermined interval (20 sec, 30 sec, or 60 sec, etc.) were used as ANN model inputs
to detect the presence of incident conditions. Generally speaking, ANN models in the field
are only used to classify traffic flow patterns at the predetermined interval into two states (or
conditions): ‘incident free’, or ‘incident present’ states. Depending on the severity, an incident
may contain tens, hundreds, or even thousands of ‘incident present’ traffic flow patterns. A
properly trained/calibrated AID model should be able to identify the majority of the traffic
flow patterns as ‘incident present’ patterns, not just at the onset of the incident but during the
entire incident period as well. Therefore, when assessing the incident detection capability of
AID models, a detection performance measure that assesses model output for detecting every
possible ‘incident present’ pattern should be utilized to better reflect the field implementation
conditions.

1.2

Research Objectives
The main objective of this research effort was to conduct an extensive study to search

ways to develop an AID using ANN that exhibits increased reliability and to develop
improved performance measures. Four different approaches were proposed to achieve the
objective. First, freeway incidents affect all three measurable traffic flow variables (volume,
speed, and occupancy). Therefore, all three traffic variables will be used in the developing
AID models to detect incidents. Second, not just incident conditions but also other variables
such as presence of entrance and exit ramps, lane expansion and merges can induce changes
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in traffic flow variables between two locations on a freeway. To study the potential
improvements of these new inputs, freeway geometric variables were also be included in the
model development process. Third, beyond models based on feed forward ANN architectures,
new models based on recurrent ANN architecture were developed to investigate whether the
new recurrent architecture adds any significance to the detection performance. Fourth, the
performance of the best ANN model developed was validated with an independent traffic data
with conventional AID algorithms to illustrate the reliability of ANN models developed in this
study. These ANN models were developed with rich data from I-880 in California.

1.3

Organization of Document
Contents of the dissertation are distributed into eight chapters. Following is a brief

description of the chapter contents.
Chapter 1

The problem of freeway incident detection and research objectives are
summarized.

Chapter 2

Background on freeway incident detection, freeway incident management, an
introduction to ANNs, existing conventional algorithms and ANN models are
discussed.

Chapter 3

This chapter gives a brief introduction to ANNs and describes the way
neurons behave in a network setting. Procedure of information processing for
a feed forward ANN with backpropagation capabilities is discussed.

Chapter 4

Describes the source of the freeway traffic flow data, incident database,
analysis of the traffic data, and process of data preparation for model inputs.
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Chapter 5

Discusses the development of various ANN models for incident detection,
introduces traffic flow variables and the freeway geometric variables as model
inputs.

Chapter 6

Discuss ANN model training and testing in detail. A modified performance
measure is introduced.

Chapter 7

ANN models and conventional AID methods are compared using evaluation
data. The results are presented in both tabular and graphical form. Both
conventional and modified performance measures are compared.

Chapter 8

Summarizes the research findings and conclusions.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND

2.1

Definition of an Incident
As various research fields have grown and branched away specializing in their

respective areas of interest, traffic engineering has been branching away into ‘traffic
operations’ and ‘traffic safety’ arenas. Traffic operation personnel may view incidentprovoked bottlenecks differently than traffic safety personnel. Several different descriptions
of incidents exist in the literature (Stephanedes and Liu 1995; Abdulhai and Ritchie 1995 and
1997). Depending on the perspective of who interprets, differences in the definitions arise.
From traffic safety viewpoint, an incident is any non-recurring event that could pose a hazard
to motorists (Abdulhai and Ritchie 1995 and 1997). The events such as disabled vehicles,
spilled loads, accidents, and temporary maintenance and construction activities can be
included in this category. From a traffic operations viewpoint, the interpretation would be
similar but limited to the events causing ‘unexpected’ congestion shockwaves, queues, and
delays. Usually the maintenance or the construction activities on freeways are planned ahead
of time and are even informed to the travelers through message signs well ahead (days and
even weeks ahead) of such an activity. Therefore, these activities are not ‘unexpected’ and
needs to be excluded in the definition (Abdulhai and Ritchie 1995 and1997). As the number
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of lanes in a freeway section increases, a minor incident on a lane may have little or no effect
on the traffic. These minor incidents that do not cause congestion and traffic delays are also
excluded from the definition as well. AID is primarily a traffic management tool. Therefore,
defining an incident as “any unexpected non-recurring event that disrupts the normal traffic
behavior, producing congestion shockwaves, queues, and traffic delays” seems logical in the
context of freeway traffic management system.

2.2

Traffic Flow under Incident Conditions
The most severe congestion problems occur at freeway bottlenecks which can be

generally defined as a portion of the freeway with lower capacity than the incoming section
of the freeway. This reduction in capacity can originate from a variety of sources such as a
decrease in the number of through traffic lanes, and reduced shoulder widths, and presence
of temporal traffic obstruction. In general, two classes of traffic bottlenecks can be identified;
recurring bottlenecks and incident provoked bottlenecks. Recurring bottlenecks occur where
the freeway itself limits capacity by, for example, a physical reduction in the number of lanes.
Such bottlenecks result from typical recurring traffic flows that exceed the restrictive
vehicular capacity of the bottleneck area. In contrast, incident-provoked bottlenecks occur
as a result of vehicle breakdown, spilled loads, or accidents that effectively reduce freeway
capacity by restricting the through movement of traffic. Since incident-provoked bottlenecks
are unexpected and temporary in nature, they have features that distinguish them from
recurring bottlenecks. For example, an accident may affect traffic flow to come to a sudden
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stop or slow down immediately while recurrent bottleneck may slow down traffic flow at
much reduced rate.
The events that occur during an incident can be pictured in traffic operational
viewpoint through a queuing diagram as shown in Figure 1. Suppose an incident occurs at a
freeway section at time t. If a constant arrival rate of vehicles (8 in vehicles per hour) is
assumed for the study period, Figure 1(a) presents the necessary input requirements to solve
the problem. Under normal conditions, service rate (µ - in vehicles per hour) of the freeway
section exceeds the arrival rate (8). Since the normal service rate (µ) of the freeway section
exceeds the arrival rate, queues would not normally form under ‘incident free’ conditions.
However, when an incident occurs at time t, it may effectively block one or more lanes of the
freeway section reducing the maximum number of vehicles that can pass through the section
(or reducing the service rate). When this reduced service rate (µ R) falls bellow the arrival rate,
traffic queues are formed and the effect of the incident begins to spread. Let the reduced
service rate lasts for tR hours.
Figure 1(b) shows the number of cumulative vehicles arrived and departed the section
as the time passed by. The arrivals are shown as a straight line passing through the origin with
a positive slope equivalent to the arrival rate (8). During the first period, the service line
follows the arrival line until the incident occurs at time t. Once the incident occurs, the service
rate becomes equivalent to µ R and maintains a flatter slope until the incident is removed. If
it is a sever in1cident that completely blocks (‘zero’ service rate) all the traffic moving in that
direction, it makes the flatter slope to a horizontal line. When the incident is cleared, the
service rate increases up to µ, and the service line gets a steeper slope.
16

Flow Rate (veh/hr)

µ

λ
µR
tR

t

Cumulative Vehicle Count

Time
(a)

Arrivals

µ
Departures
λ
µR
tR
0

t

Time
(b)

Figure 1. Queuing Diagram for Incident Occurrence in Freeway System
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This continues until the arrival line and the service line intercept, at which time the service line
once again overlays the arrival line.
Although traffic flow under incident conditions can be simulated using modeling
software such as INTRAS (Integrated Traffic Simulation) and INTEGRATION, formulating
analytical models to detect freeway incidents have not been much successful. Willsky et al.
(1980) have developed dynamic models to estimate traffic flow parameters that may relate
to incidents. Using non-linear differential equations, the density and speed of freeway links
(or sections) have been modeled. Section capacity was expressed as a function of equilibrium
density (the highest traffic density when the equilibrium traffic speed starts to decrease),
equilibrium speed, and jam density. Traffic volume and occupancy measured at every 5
second intervals from loop detectors at upstream and downstream have been used to estimate
the density and speed by means of a Kalman filter. An incident causes to decrease the
equilibrium density of the section which decreases the capacity. This reduction in the capacity
was used to detect incidents. Experience has shown that modeling equations may not always
replicate actual traffic flow satisfactorily (Cheu and Ritchie 1994).

2.3

Incident Management Systems
Providing a solution to non-recurrent congestion problem through coordinated

activities designed to reduce the impact of incidents on traffic is generally described as
incident management. The coordinated activities include use of personnel and equipment
resources from one or more emergency management agencies in mitigating the non-recurrent
congestion. Primary objectives of incident management are to reduce traffic delay that
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incident condition creates and to increase the traveler safety. Therefore, rapid detection,
response, and clearance of incidents are necessary characteristics for an incident management
system to be successful. In general, an incident management system can include several
components.

(i) Detection: The determination that an incident of some nature has occurred at a location,
for which an appropriate response can be formulated, is the detection component. Freeway
incidents can be detected either by manual methods or automated methods. Manual methods
are based on visual processes that include traffic surveillance CCTV cameras, cellular phone
calls, roadside call boxes, routine police patrol, etc. Automated methods are mainly based on
traffic flow data gathered from inductive loops buried under pavement or road side detectors
and include conventional algorithms and artificial neural network-based models.

(ii) Verification: The determination of the approximate location with a certain accuracy (i.e.,
between two adjacent exit and entrance ramps or between two traffic observation stations
[e.g., inductive loop stations, CCTV camera locations, etc.]) and the nature of the incident
is the verification component of the incident management system.

(iii) Emergency response: Once an incident is detected and verified, the process of initiation
and transportation of the appropriate emergency management personnel and equipment to and
from the incident location falls under emergency response component. Traditionally, the
communication of incident information is handled by police dispatches, but an increasing
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number of local governments and states are building special multipurpose traffic management
centers to coordinate variety of traffic, incident, and other emergency communications.

(iv) Site management: Once at the scene, the use of appropriate traffic control measures at
the incident location and control of emergency resources is known as the site management.
This is in fact one of the crucial tasks that must be managed with great care to ensure safety
of the emergency personnel and traveling public and to reduce overall traffic delay. Depending
on the severity of the casualty, one or more lanes may be temporarily closed to facilitate
landing and taking off of emergency medical service helicopters.

(v) Clearance: The clearance is the removal of debris, spilled materials, and wreckage to
restore the roadway to its normal condition until the section capacity is regained. Depending
on the severity of the incident, one or more lanes may be temporarily closed to clear the
roadway from debris and perhaps to repair the damages to the highway infrastructure.

(vi) Travel advisory: The circulation of accurate and timely information to the traveling public
concerning traffic conditions at the incident location and suggested alternate routes is known
as the travel advisory. An increasing number of local governments and states utilize highway
advisory radio, variable message signs, Internet, and other communication methods to convey
congestion information and to encourage the drivers to take alternate routes. An effective
travel advisory can essentially reduce the traffic queue and travel delay to a greater extent.
Many local and state governmental agencies are creating partnership with private agencies
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such as TV Cable service providers, commercial radio stations, and companies with traffic
information services to transmit real time traffic conditions to the traveling public.
Incident management systems are deployed in several cities across the country
including Atlanta, Boston, Charlotte, Chicago, Dallas / Fort Worth, Denver, Detroit, Los
Angeles, Minneapolis / St. Paul, New York City, Phoenix, Sacramento, Seattle, and
Washington DC (ATA 1997). Nine of these metropolitan areas currently have automatic
detectors and the remaining metropolitan areas are planing to install automatic detectors. All
these metropolitan areas have variables message signs to issue advance warning to travelers
about freeway traffic conditions ahead.

Incident Detection Methods
The incidents are detected and reported by several different means. Currently, the
incidents are reported via routine police patrols, call boxes or motorist aid phones, and
cellular phones, citizen’s broadcast radios (CBR), etc. The incidents are detected via inductive
loop detectors, closed circuit television cameras (CCTV’s), and infrared video imaging, etc.
The incident detection process can be divided into manual and automatic detection methods.
Examples for the manual detection methods include routine police patrol, manual inspection
of CCTV monitors, distress calls made through call boxes, cellular phones, and CBRs. The
automatic detection methods, at a minimum, can utilize real time traffic data gathered from
inductive loop detectors, infrared video images, and other road side detectors to detect
incidents.
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Traditionally, routine police patrol and public using call boxes, citizen’s broadcasting
radios, or cellular phone calls reported incidents. The location description from some of these
eye witness counts (especially the information gathered from distress calls from affected
parties, cellular callers, and citizen’s broadcasting radios, etc.) may be quite imprecise (Ivan
1994; Yim and Ygnance 1995). Although these traditional sources can provide information
of incidents anywhere in a freeway system, there is no guarantee that each incident will be
reported promptly, or will be reported at all. Traffic Management Centers (TMC) cannot just
rely on the fact that every incident will be promptly reported to them by the citizens.
Therefore, developing less labor and resource intensive incident detection methods are
essential for managing traffic on our freeways today.
With the invent of advanced technologies and implementation of intelligent
transportation systems, more agencies are seeking solutions through of state of the art
technologies and equipments to identify traffic incident conditions and the incident locations
on freeways. Several researches have developed methods to automate the incident detection
process through algorithms (Payne et al. 1978; Arceneaux et al. 1989; Presaud and Hall 1989;
Hall et al. 1991; Stephanedes and Chassiakos 1993 ) and artificial neural network models
(Wiederholt et al. 1993; Hsiao 1994; Cheu and Ritchie 1994; Stephanedes and Liu 1995;
Abdulhai and Ritchie 1995 and 1997) that are based on the traffic data gathered from
inductive loop detectors.
The ideal freeway traffic management system would include automated incident
detection methods with higher reliability before resorting to manual detection via closed
circuit television systems. The camera system can be used to confirm and classify incidents,
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and to aid operator dispatch process, and is not intended to be a primary incident detection
tool (Wiederholt et al. 1993). Operating a TMC with AID methods can be more efficient and
cost effective because fewer operators will be needed to monitor larger areas of the freeway.
Using a combination of AID method and CCTV observation, incidents can be classified more
reliably and in greater detail. Therefore, more detailed information can be provided to the
public via the radio, television, variable message signs, and other advanced traffic information
system devices.

2.4

Automatic Incident Detection Systems
Freeway traffic incidents may be caused by excessive speed differences among

individual vehicles, abrupt lane changing vehicles, slow-moving vehicles, spilled loads on
roadway, weather conditions, road surface conditions, other geometric features of the
freeway, etc. Whatever the cause may be, these incidents leave subtle footprints on traffic
volume, speed, and occupancy patterns. To declare an incident condition, every AID method
relies on identification or classification of these footprints from the traffic flow data.
However, distinguishing these footprints left behind by traffic incidents from those left behind
by common bottlenecks have been a very troublesome challenge as echoed by low
performance levels of conventional AID methods. To increase overall performance, many
AID methods utilized a ‘threshold’ concept. According to the threshold concept, if a certain
parameter of the detection system, estimated from traffic data, is greater than a predefined
threshold value, an incident alarm is declared. These threshold values are predetermined for
best performance by trial and error using traffic data with known ‘incident present’ and
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‘incident free’ traffic flow conditions. Detection systems may even use multiple threshold
values (e.g., California algorithm no. 8) depending on the design of particular AID method.
The AID methods can obtain traffic data from sources such as inductive loop
detectors, video images, or roadside to vehicle communication (e.g., Advanced Vehicle
Identification [AVI]) systems. In freeways where traffic data gathering is based on inductive
loops, almost every lane is equipped with pairs inductive loops that are buried under the
pavement. Usually, each pair in each lane is aligned together and buried perpendicular to the
traffic lanes on sections along the freeway. The spacing between adjacent loop pairs, in
general, depends up on the freeway geometric features. Based on number of locations being
used to gather traffic data for each traffic condition detection attempt, the AID systems can
be grouped into two major categories (Busch and Fellendorf 1990) as follows:
(i)

Single station-based systems: That is the traffic data utilized in each traffic condition
detection attempt is exclusively extracted at a single loop station. A few single station
incident detection systems (Hall et al. 1993; Hsiao 1994; Antoniades and Stephanedes
1996) exist in the literature.

(ii)

Multi-station based systems: That is the traffic data utilized in each traffic condition
detection attempt is extracted from at least two adjacent loop stations. Majority of the
detection methods found in literature utilize traffic data gathered at adjacent two loop
stations.
Both groups can be subdivided further, by the type of input data the system requires,

into microscopic and macroscopic systems. Microscopic systems need detailed data from
individual vehicles, whereas the macroscopic systems rely on aggregated data of a group of
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vehicles during a predetermined interval (for example, average speed over a 30-second
period). Video image and AVI-based systems are some examples of microscopic systems,
whereas many algorithm and neural network-based systems are examples of macroscopic
systems. Artificial neural network model developed by Hsiao (1994) is an example of single
station model, and the model developed by Cheu and Ritchie (1994), and Stephanedes and
Liu (1995) are examples of multi-station models.

2.5

Previous Models
Automatic incident detection systems can be divided into two categories: algorithm-

based systems and neural network-based systems. The algorithm-based systems are mainly
computer programs in the form of “IF.. THEN..” logics that can distinguish different
scenarios using predetermined thresholds. These ‘algorithm-based’ incident detection systems
utilize linear/polynomial equations and/or combination of graphs based on empirical
rules/observations to detect incidents. Neural network systems on the other hand utilize
artificially created intelligence (knowledge) to detect incidents. The most critical difference
between these two systems is that algorithm techniques require the empirical
relationships/conditions between the input data and the conclusions (outputs). On the
contrary, the neural network systems do not need to have the empirical relationships between
inputs and outputs already established since it can capture those relationships directly from
the data (Pietrzyk and Perez 1996).
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2.5.1 Algorithm-Based Models
Several attempts have been made over the past three decades to automate freeway
incident detection process. Of these attempts, algorithm-based models were the first models
developed (California Algorithm in 1976) to detect freeway incidents automatically. Other
algorithm-based models such as McMaster algorithm (Presaud and Hall 1989; Hall et al.
1991) and Minnesota algorithm (Stephanedes and Chassiakos 1993) were developed with the
intention of improving reliability of automated incident detection. The California and
Minnesota algorithms are two-station algorithms whereas McMaster algorithm is a singlestation algorithm. Since the ANN models developed in this study is a two-station model, only
California algorithm and Minnesota algorithms are used for comparative evaluation of ANN
model results and are discussed in detail in the following sections.

2.5.1.1 California Algorithm
Payne et al. (1976) introduced the California algorithm based on discontinuity in
occupancy values between two adjacent loop detector stations. It utilizes 60 second average
occupancy, from adjacent loop detectors, transformed in to four different estimates to be used
as algorithm inputs. The inputs are in the form of absolute, relative and temporal differences
in occupancy values between two stations. California algorithm no. 8 was selected in this
study since it consists of a five minute roll-wave suppression logic that aims to reduce false
alarms due to shock waves approaching from the downstream. In the algorithm no. 8, traffic
status is divided into 8-different states. Figure 2 shows the input features, description of
traffic status, and structure of the algorithm. Starting from a known traffic status, it uses “IF
26

BEGIN

T

T

8

T

STATE>=7

T

DOCCTD>=T2

T

0

DOCCTD>=T2

0

STATE>=1

F

F

F

DOCC>=T5

T
1

STATE>=1

F

T

DOCC>=T5

F

F

0

STATE>=7

F

0

F

STATE>=2

2

1
incident-free
comp. Wave this minute
comp. Wave 2,3,4,5 min. ago
tentative incident
incident confirmed
incident continuing

FEATURES
DOCC
downstream occupancy
OCCDF spatial occupancy difference
DOCCTD downstream occupancy temporal difference
OCCRDF relative difference in spatial occupancy

F

2

F

STATE>=3

3

OCCDF>=T1

F

0

T

STATE>=3

F

3

T

T

T

STATE>=2
T

T

T

STATES
0
1
2,3,4,5
6
7
8

F

F

OCCRDF>=T3

F
7

STATE>=6

OCCRDF>=T3

F

0

T

STATE>=4

F

4

DOCC>=T4

F

6

T

T
F

STATE>=4

4

T

STATE>=5

F

T
5

0

T
F

STATE>=5

5

0

T
0

Five-minute roll-wave suppression

Figure 2. California Algorithm No. 8 with Five-minute Roll-wave Suppression Logic
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California algorithm #2

.... THEN” logic (or decision tree) to determine the change in the traffic status according to
changes in occupancy values between two stations. The algorithm has five threshold values
in the logic to determine if traffic status was changed. If a significant discontinuity in
occupancy is detected, change in the traffic status initiates an incident alarm.
Arceneaux et al. (1989) reported calibration accuracy of algorithm no. 8 as 50-20%
detection rate and 0.125 to 0.003% false alarm rates using traffic data gathered from Los
Angeles freeway system. Al-Deek et al. (1994) showed that the calibration of California
algorithms 7, 8, and 10 was lengthy process that involved testing as many combinations of
threshold values as possible.

2.5.1.2 Minnesota Algorithm
Stephanedes and Chassiakos (1993) introduced this algorithm which is also based on
identifying discontinuities in traffic occupancy values. The Minnesota algorithm is built with
a moving average filter that uses 30 second occupancy data from two adjacent loop stations.
At time t, upstream station’s occupancy value, otu, and downstream station’s occupancy
value, otd, are used to calculate the spatial occupancy difference (otu - otd). The hypothesis
tested assumes that an incident occurred at time t-5 and compares the average spatial
occupancy value changes between upstream and downstream stations before the incident and
after incident.
Average spatial occupancy differences from time t-5 to t, and from t-15 to t-6 intervals
are calculated as follows:
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y at =

1 5
∑ (o u − o dt − k )
6 k =0 t− k

(1)

where yta is the average occupancy difference between upstream and downstream stations
during the previous six consecutive time intervals.
1 15 u
y =
(o t − k − o dt − k )
∑
10 k = 6
b
t

(2)

where ytb is the average occupancy difference between upstream and downstream stations
during the previous sixth and fifteenth consecutive time intervals.
To increase the transferability potential, these spatial variations are transformed into
two different ratios as follows:
RAT1 =

y at
mt

(3)

and
y at − y bt
RAT2 =
mt

(4)

where RAT1 ratio is to test the discontinuity in spatial occupancy during the last six time
steps, RAT2 ratio is to evaluate the change in spatial occupancy between after and before the
incident occurs, and mt is a normalization factor to account for traffic conditions prior to the
incident and is defined as follows:
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mt =

15
15
1
max{∑ o ut − k ; ∑ o dt − k }
10
k=6
k=6

(5)

The structure of this algorithm is shown in Figure 3. The two threshold values ‘Thr1’
and ‘Thr2’ used in the algorithm are predetermined from trial and error process using traffic
data for known ‘incident present’ and ‘incident free’ traffic conditions. The algorithm includes
two tests: congestion detection test and an incident detection test. Traffic congestion is
detected if RAT1 is found to be greater than the threshold ‘Thr1.’ Once a congested traffic
condition is detected, an incident is declared if RAT2 is greater than the threshold ‘Thr2.’
Continuation of the incident is detected by presence of traffic congestion after incident is
detected.

2.5.2 Artificial Neural Network-Based Models
The performance of these conventional algorithms has not provided acceptable
performance levels (Stephanedes and Liu 1995), as they have been hindered by excessive false
alarm rates at higher detection rates. During the past two decades, as the technology became
more advanced, many researchers took advantage of the powerful and efficient computer
systems and exposed artificial neural networks applications in numerous speciality fields.
Artificial neural networks (ANNs) are good at trend prediction, pattern recognition,
modeling, control, signal filtering, noise reduction, image analysis, classification, evaluation
etc. (Lawrence 1993). In fact, new uses for artificial neural networks are being found in a
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INCIDENT
CONTINUES

variety of research fields every day. However, every application of ANN shares the ability to
make associations between known inputs and outputs by observing many examples.
Researchers in transportation engineering have used artificial neural networks since late 80's.
The application attempts included simulating driver behavior (Yang et al. 1992; Dougherty
and Joint 1992), estimating travel time (Nelson and Palacharla 1993; Hua and Faghri 1994),
classifying pavement distress from video images (Hua and Faghri 1993), detecting vehicles
from images (Mead et al. 1994; Belgaroui and Blosseville 1993), and detecting incidents.
Ann-based freeway incident detection studies, found through an extensive literature survey,
are briefly discussed in chronological order.
Wiederholt et al. (1993) developed two single-station ANN models to detect
incidents. Traffic flow variables (speed, volume, and occupancy) were simulated for Highway
401 in Toronto, Canada, using a calibrated INTEGRATION model. INTEGRATION is a
dynamic traffic network and controller simulating software. Observed traffic patterns from
Toronto section of the highway 401 between 2pm and 3pm on June 8, 1992 were used to
generate the simulated traffic flow. The simulated output data were averaged over all lanes
at 20 second intervals for sixty-one different one-hour traffic scenarios. Traffic data from ten
links (or sections) were divided into training and testing data sets in the ANN model
development. The two ANN models were based on single loop station traffic data. Inputs for
the first model included link number, and traffic data (speed, volume, and occupancy) at
current time interval. Inputs for the second model included link number, and historical traffic
data from current time interval up to two previous time intervals. Both models consisted of
a single hidden layer and a single output neuron. Model outputs were transformed into binary
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format with ‘1’ indicating ‘incident present’ condition and ‘0’ indicating ‘incident free’
condition. The two models were tested with a fixed number of hidden layer neurons (10 and
12 hidden layer neurons in the first and second models, respectively). Learning rate of 1.5 and
a momentum rate of 0.9 were used in training both models. Performance of both models after
training and testing resulted a detection rate of 97% and false alarm rate of 3%.
Cheu and Ritchie (1994) developed a two-station ANN model to automate the
detection of freeway incidents. Model training and testing were performed using simulated
freeway traffic flow data from INTRAS. INTRAS is a microscopic freeway traffic simulation
software. Traffic data from eight detector stations in a 5-mile section on westbound SR-91
Riverside freeway in Orange County, California were gathered in the study. Traffic volume
from 4:45am to 7:30pm on January 3, 1991 were used to simulate the traffic flow. Simulated
volume and occupancy values averaged over all lanes during 30 second intervals were used
in model development. The model inputs included normalized volume and occupancy values
from upstream station up to four previous time intervals and downstream station up to two
previous time intervals. The architecture that provided highest performance had an input layer
with 16 nodes, a hidden layer with 9 neurons, and an output layer with a single neuron.
Output of the network was translated into binary format with ‘1’ to suggest ‘incident present’
condition and ‘0’ to suggest ‘incident free’ condition. Model performance estimates indicated
a detection rate of 80% with a false alarm rate of 1.46% during an evaluation phase using
simulated traffic data.
Combining fuzzy logic and artificial neural networks, Hsiao (1994) developed an
automatic incident detection system. Traffic data collected at 14 loop detector stations on
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Highway 401 in Toronto, Canada, from February 5 through April 7, 1993, were used in
model training and evaluation. The model inputs included traffic volume, occupancy, and
speed averaged during 20-second intervals. Fuzzy logics were used to classify each input
variable (in numeric format) into ‘low’, ‘medium’, and ‘high’ linguistic categories representing
‘0’, ‘1’, and ‘2’ respectively. Model output included two possibilities; incident ‘possible’ and
incident ‘impossible.’ The model is a single station model with 3 input layer nodes, double
hidden layers connected in a feed-forward format, and an output layer with a single neuron.
Traffic data at current time interval were the only input variables used in the model.
Performance rates of the best model during the training estimated a detection rate of 76.19%
and a false alarm rate of 8.05%.
In 1995, Stephanedes and Liu developed a two-station based feed-forward neural
network to detect freeway incidents. Traffic data collected at 14 detector stations along a 5.5
mile corridor in westbound I-35 in Minneapolis, Minnesota, during a 72-day period in 1989
were used in the model development process. It consisted of one minute traffic volume and
occupancy data updated every 30 second intervals and averaged over all lanes during 4:00pm
to 6:00pm. The network had 40 input layer nodes (excluding the node for the threshold bias
unit), 30 hidden layer neurons, and a single output layer neuron. Model inputs consisted of
traffic volume and occupancy data at 10 consecutive 30 second time intervals from pairs of
adjacent loop stations. The training data contained 425 input patterns including ‘incident free’
and ‘incident present’ conditions. During the training, model output had either ‘0’ or ‘1’ to
indicate ‘incident free’ or ‘incident present’ conditions. The testing data included all the traffic
data collected during 140 hours over 72 day period. During model testing, the output
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consisted of a continuous value between ‘0’ and ‘1’. When the output was greater than a
predefined threshold value (0.5 in this case) the traffic condition was interpreted as ‘incident
present’ and ‘incident free’ otherwise. The model had a detection rate of 70 to 80% with a
false alarm rate of 0.12 to 0.26% during the model testing process.
Abdulhai and Ritchie (1995 and 1997) used a modified probabilistic neural network
(PNN) to automate the freeway incident detection process. The modified PNN includes an
input layer, three hidden layers, and an output layer. One of the three hidden layers, known
as a pattern layer stores input patterns. The number of neurons in the pattern layer is
equivalent to the number of training patterns in the network. Abdulhai and Ritchie (1997)
used the same data that Cheu and Ritchie (1994) used in their study. A modified form of the
Bayesian-based method was employed in the model development process. The universality
or transferability concept of AIDMs was introduced and described in detail. The study
considered an AIDM is transferable if a trained model can be directly applied, without
recalibration of any parameters, to a new geometric location or the same geometric location
after significant laps in time. Model was tested with simulated data for westbound I-35 and
the performance results yielded an impressive detection rate of 100% with a false alarm rate
of 4.77% (Abdulhai and Ritchie 1995).
All the AID systems based on ANN studies discussed above exhibit an overall
improvement in incident detection performance over the conventional algorithms (e.g.,
California and Minnesota algorithms). However, these ANN-based studies still have some
short comings. For example, one hour traffic pattern used in Wiederholt et al. (1993) study
may not be a representative enough to simulate variety of traffic conditions that exists in a
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freeway system. Many ANN-based models described above (except model developed by
Stephanedes and Liu 1995) used simulated traffic data to train ANN models. Cheu and
Ritchie (1994) stated that the experience have shown the modeling equations may not always
be satisfactory in replicating traffic flow in actual situations, leaving some concern over
estimated traffic flow variables using dynamic modeling. Therefore, the model performance
may contain some sampling bias. ANN models developed by Cheu and Ritchie (1994),
Stephanedes and Liu (1995), and Abdulhai and Ritchie (1995) used only two of the three
traffic variables as model inputs despite all three traffic variables are affected by incidents. Still
every model used a conventional detection rate that may not truly reflect the capability of
detecting individual incident patterns as described later in this section. Since a separate hidden
layer neuron is required for separate input pattern for each example in the training data set,
PNN models can become quite large. Once trained, these PNN models take more time to run
than back propagation networks (Lawrence 1993). Furthermore, in problems such as incident
detection with large amount of complex data, back propagation is more accurate (Specht and
Shapiro 1991).
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CHAPTER 3
DESCRIPTION OF ARTIFICIAL NEURAL NETWORKS

The most complex biological network ever known to this date is the human brain. It
consists of hundreds of billions of special cells, known as neurons, which are connected
together in complex form. These neurons send information back and forth to each other
through their connections. A network of this kind can perform intelligent functions such as
learning, analysis, prediction, and recognition. The functions of these neurons in human brain
are mimicked in artificial neural networks using computers. However, the neurons in human
brain are much more complicated than the neurons used in the artificial neural networks.
Hecht-Nielsen (1990) defines an artificial neural network (ANN) as,
“... a parallel, distributed information processing structure consisting of processing
elements (which can possess a local memory and carry out localized information
processing operations) interconnected via unidirectional signal channels called
connections. Each processing element has a single output connection that branches
into as many collateral connections as desired; each carries the same signal - the
processing element output signal. The processing element output signal can be of
any mathematical type desired. The information processing that goes on within each
processing element can be defined arbitrarily with the restriction that it must be
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completely local; that is, it must depend only on the current values of the input
signals arriving at the processing element via impinging connections and on values
stored in the processing element’s local memory.”
The neurons in most common ANNs are usually organized in three type of layers:
input, hidden, and output layers. Neurons in an input layer just act as information feeding
points and do not involve in any sort information processing. Therefore, they are referred as
input nodes in this study. An ANN may contain one or more hidden layers depending on the
problem and the best number of neurons in each layer is determined by trial and error. In the
literature, preferred method of referring to an ANN architecture is by the number of hidden
layers. Therefore, these terminologies were followed throughout this dissertation. The number
of input layer neurons is equivalent to the number of input variables in a problem. Usually, an
ANN has a single output layer and the number of output layer neurons is equal to the number
of outputs required in the solution. The number of input nodes and output neurons are
dictated by the problem itself. Behavior of a larger ANN can be easily explained once the
behavior of a single neuron is clearly understood. The purpose of this chapter is to give a
general understanding of the process of information flow in an ANN with feed-forward
structure with backpropagation capability process information during training and actual
implementation.

3.1

Behavior of a Single Neuron
A neural network is composed of several neurons that are connected to one or more

neurons by synapses or links. These connections are characterized by a strength or weight of
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their own. A weight is positive if the associated synapse is excitatory and is negative if the
synapse is inhibitory.
Consider a single neuron with I input nodes as shown in Figure 4. When the neuron
processes information, input signal (xi) of ith input node (i=1,2,3, .. ,I), which is connected by
a synapse to the neuron, is multiplied by the synaptic weight wi. Every input signal weighted
by the respective synapses is summed at the neuron. Activation (or squashing) function limits
the amplitude of the output (the summation) of the neuron and yields the non-linearity feature
of the information processing. Typically, the range of normalized amplitude of the neuron’s
output is set to be a closed unit interval [0 , 1] or [-1 , 1]. For the single nonlinear neuron (as
in Figure 4), the following equations show this data processing operation mathematically:
I

u=

∑w
i =1

i

(6)

xi

where u is the net input to the neuron and xi is the input signal from an input node i, and wi
is the connection weight from an input node i to the neuron.

y = ϕ (u − θ )

(7)

where y is the neuron’s output signal (also known as its activation), n(.) is the activation
function for the neuron, and 2 is the bias threshold used to offset the net input to the neuron.
The activation function defines the output of a neuron in terms of the activity level of
its input. Depending on the application, a variety of activation functions are being used by
researchers. In this study, a piecewise-linear function and a sigmoid function were used

39

x1
w1
Input
Signals

x2

w2
E

u

Activation
function
n(.)

Output

Summing
junction

wI

y

2
Threshold

xI

Figure 4. Model of a Nonlinear Neuron

in the ANN models. Basic features of these two activation functions are briefly discussed
next.
A piecewise-linear function provides continuously varying values in [-0.5, 0.5] input
range and constant values (‘0’ or ‘1’) on either side of the input range. The activation
function is defined by:

n(u) =

1

if u ≥ ½

u+½

if ½ > u > -½

0

if u ≤ - ½

(8)

where u is the total summation at a neuron and n(u) is the activation function. The behavior
of the piecewis linear function is shown in Figure 5.
The sigmoid or logistic function is by far the most common form of activation function
used in the development of artificial neural networks. It is a strictly increasing
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function that exhibits smoothness and asymptotic properties. With a positive slope parameter,
a, the sigmoidal function is defined by:

ϕ ( u) =

1
1 + e − au

(9)

By varying the parameter a, different slopes of sigmoid function can be obtained as
shown in Figure 6. Rumelhart and McClelland (1986) discussed the features of sigmoid
function in great detail and stressed the importance of unit activation functions in the
development of artificial neural networks.
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3.2

Behavior of a Network of Neurons
An ANN is built up of several neurons in hidden and output layers. These neurons in

a network function in the fashion explained in the previous section. To understand how an
ANN process information, consider a simple single-hidden-layer feed forward network with
backpropagation capabilities as shown in Figure 7. Nodes in input layer are represented by
subscript i and the neurons in hidden and output layers are represented by subscripts j and k
respectively. The inputs to the network are denoted by xi (where i = 0,1,2, ... ,I), and the
output from hidden layer and output layer neurons are denoted by yj (where j = 0,1,2, ... ,J)
and zk (where k = 1 in this case) respectively. Synaptic weight wj0 (corresponding to a fixed
input x0 = -1), equivalent to the bias threshold 2j, is added to the jth neuron in the hidden layer
(where j = 1,2,...,J). Similarly, synaptic weight wk0 (corresponding to a fixed input y0 = -1),
equivalent to the bias threshold 2k, is added to the output layer neuron (where k = 1).
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Figure 7. Single-Hidden-Layer Feed-Forward Neural Network

The purpose of the input layer node i = 0 and the hidden layer node j = 0 is to
represent the bias threshold values for hidden layer neurons j = 1,2,3,....,J and output layer
neuron k = 1. This representation makes the formulation of learning process of the network
much easier. The training processing of the network consists of two distinct steps; a feedforward (forward pass) step and a backpropagation (backward pass) step. (Backpropagation
is the learning technique used in this study.)

3.2.1 Feed-Forward
In the feed-forward step, the array of input data is presented to the network, and the
current connection weight and bias threshold values (2j’s and 2k’s - values used to offset the
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net input to each neuron) are used to calculate the resulting output value. The input signals
are processed as follows.
(i)

For each neuron in the hidden layer, every input signal is multiplied by the weight of
the connection from that input node to the hidden layer neuron.

(ii)

The total of these weighted input signals and the bias threshold is the net input to the
hidden layer neuron. This net input becomes the argument for the activation function
which determines the hidden layer neuron’s output signal yj according to equation 7.
For the neural network with a single hidden layer as shown in Figure 7, the above

process can be mathematically derived. The output from jth hidden layer neuron is:
I

y j = ϕ j (∑ w ji x i )

(10)

i=0

These hidden layer outputs yj (where j = 1,2, ... ,J) and the bias threshold y0 multiplied
by their corresponding weight values wkj (where k = 1 and j = 0,1,2, ... ,J) are fed into the
output layer neuron as inputs. This set of hidden layer outputs, in a feed forward network,
produces the following output from the output layer neuron:
J

J

I

j= 0

j= 0

i=0

z k = ϕ k ( ∑ w kj y j ) = ϕ k ( ∑ w kj [ϕ j ( ∑ w ji x i )])

(11)

3.2.2 Back-propagation
The output (zk) calculated for each input pattern is compared with the corresponding
desired output. Gradient steepest descent, using the square of the difference between the
desired and observed output as an error function, is used to adjust the connection weights and
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bias thresholds so that the network can return an output closer to the desired output when it
is presented to the network next time. According to general leaning rule (delta rule) in
correcting any connection weight at the end of t cycles, the value of the weight for the cycle
t+1 is estimated as the summation of weight at cycle t and weight correction applied at the
end of the cycle t. This step is shown in the following equation.
w ( t + 1) = w ( t ) + ∆ w ( t )

(12)

The weight correction, )w(t), is estimated as proportional to the decrease in error
function with respect to the connection weight. Mathematically, this can be written as,

∆ w( t ) = − η

∂E
∂w

(13)

The value ‘0’ is the leaning rate of the neural network. Square error function, E, for
the network output is one half of the sum of squared differences between the desired and
predicted output of the output layer neurons for a single input pattern. This can be
represented in the following equation:

E=

1
(d k − z k ) 2
∑
2 k

(14)

where, ‘dk’ is the desired output of the kth output neuron (in this case k=1).
In gradient steepest descent method, the partial derivative of the error function is
calculated with respect to each connection weight for an output layer to estimate the weight
correction as follows:
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∂E
= − (d k − z k )
∂ w kj

J

I

j= 0

i =0

∂ [ ϕ k ( ∑ w kj ϕ j ( ∑ w ji x i ))]
∂ w kj

I

= − δ k ϕ j ( ∑ w ji x i )
i= 0

(15)

where *k is given by the following equation.
J

I

j= 0

i= 0

δ k = (d k − z k )ϕ ( ∑ w kjϕ j ( ∑ w ji x i ))
'
k

(16)

Similarly, the gradient descent for the hidden layer can be formulated by taking the
partial derivative of the error function with respect to each connection weight for the hidden
layer neurons as follows:

∂E
= − ∑ (d k − z k )
∂ w ji
k

J

I

j= 0

i=0

∂ [ϕ k ( ∑ w kj ϕ j ( ∑ w ji x i ))]
∂ w ji

= − δ j xi

(17)

where *j is given by the following equation:
I

J

i= 0

j= 0

δ j = ϕ 'j (∑ w ji x i )∑ δ k w kj

(18)

Each partial derivative in equations (15) and (17) is the basis for calculating the
appropriate adjustment for the corresponding connection weight. The smaller the learning
rate, 0, the smaller the change to the synaptic weights in the network will be from one
iteration to the next. As the change in synaptic weights gets smaller, the trajectory in weight
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space will be smoother. This improvement, however, is attained at the cost of a slower rate
of learning. If, on the other hand, a larger learning rate (too large to speed up the learning
rate) is used, the resulting large changes in the synaptic weights assume such a form that the
whole network may become unstable (i.e., the error term oscillates and seizes to converge to
a single value). Rumelhart and McClelland (1986) used a simple method to increase the rate
of learning and yet avoid the danger of instability through a modified delta rule by introducing
a momentum term ". This modified correction with the momentum term for the output layer
is given by the following equation:
I

∆ w kj ( t ) = η δ k ϕ j (∑ w ji x i ) + α ∆ w kj ( t − 1)

(19)

i=0

The modified correction for the hidden layer can be represented by the following:

∆ w ji = η δ j x i + α ∆ w ji ( t − 1)

(20)

where )wkj and )wji are the changes computed for the connection weights from hidden layer
neuron j to output layer neuron k and input layer unit i to hidden layer neuron j respectively,
and *j is the error propagated backward through neuron j.
The network training continues until the error stops decreasing. During the training,
the network works to fit the training data with which it is presented, and the direction or
extent of the adjustments to the connection weights is not controlled. If it is allowed to train
too long, it will over-fit the training data, or tailor its weight vector too closely to input
patterns which may not represent conditions the network will face in operation (Caudill
1990). This problem can be resolved by specifying a maximum training cycles (epoches).
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CHAPTER 4
FREEWAY DATA

The majority of AID models developed in previous studies were trained (or calibrated)
using simulated freeway incident conditions. Of the ANN models developed, Cheu and
Ritchie (1994), Stephanedes and Liu (1995), and Abdulhai and Ritchie (1997) used actual
freeway data to evaluate the models. When simulating traffic flow conditions, the traffic is
assumed to follow traffic flow equations and other conditions inherent to the simulation
package. Especially under traffic congestion, these theoretical assumptions and equations may
not best explain the behavior of actual traffic flow. Therefore, real-world traffic data were
used in this research to subdue these negative effects in AID model training.

4.1

Data Source
Real-world traffic data from a freeway (I-880) in Hayward, California were used in

this study. Both traffic and incident data were collected and made available by the PATH
program at the University of California at Berkeley, California. The study site is 9.2 miles
long and has 3 to 5 lanes in each direction at various locations of the freeway. A layout of
freeway geometry is shown in Figure 8.
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4.2

Data Description
Between Industrial and Lewelling exits, northbound section of the freeway is divided

into 17-cross-sections (or stations) while southbound section is divided into 16-cross-sections
as shown in Figure 8. At each cross section of the freeway, a pair of inductive loops is buried
under the pavement on each lane as shown in small squares. Spacing between adjacent loop
stations ranges from 1000 feet to 3300 feet. Entrance and exit ramps are instrumented with
single loop detectors. Loop data were collected from 5am - 10am and 2pm - 8pm. Probe
vehicles were used to collect real time incident data. These probe vehicles were in operation
from 6:30am - 9:30am and 3:30pm - 6:30pm during weekdays collecting incident data. The
signal from loop detectors were in non-ASCII format and had been processed to obtain traffic
volume, speed, and occupancy of each lane at each station using a software developed by the
University of California at Berkeley. These traffic flow variables averaged over all lanes
during 30 second interval were used in this study.
Incident data were collected through probe vehicles which were operating with a 7
minute headway in the study corridor. When a probe vehicle encountered an incident, the
driver transmitted information such as the incident location, vehicle type, direction, and
number of vehicles involved to a command center located near the study corridor. This
information was then processed to create a comprehensive incident database. The incident
database collected during February 16 - March 19, 1993 has 1210 incident records and that
collected during September 27 - October 29, 1993 has 971 incident records.
Besides the traffic flow variables, freeway geometric data such as presence of entrance
and exit ramps and lane expansion and merger information were also considered as model
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inputs. The northbound has 5-entrance and 6-exit ramps while the southbound has 6-entrance
ramps and 5-exit ramps in the study area. The northbound has 2-lane expansions and 2-lane
mergers while the southbound has 1-lane expansion and 2-lane mergers.

4.3

Data Verification
In this study, daily traffic flow data from every mainline loop station in both directions

were inspected for consistency and continuity. The inspection was conducted by preparing
3-dimensional graphs of volume, speed, and occupancy each using the Matlab software.
Abnormal and missing data were then identified and removed from the model development
phase. Three samples of such 3-dimensional graphs for northbound afternoon traffic on
February 16, 1993 are shown in Figures 9, 10, and 11. The minimum and maximum ranges
of each traffic flow variable were also obtained to establish a data normalization criterion.
The location information of some incidents was found inaccurate. To fix this problem,
the incident database was compared with the probe vehicle database (or car database). The
driver of the probe vehicle presses a key of an onboard computer when an incident is
encountered. The car database consists of odometer reading and the time when the driver
passed the key. This information was compared with the freeway layout and the incident
database to determine the correct location of the incident.
Once the traffic flow data and incident database were scrutinized, traffic flow data
were subjected to a final visual verification. This was necessary to confirm continuity of traffic
flow data between two stations and exact location of incidents to be used in the model
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Figure 9. Distribution of Afternoon NB Volume on I-880 on February 16, 1993

development process. The traffic volume, speed, and occupancy data were plotted against
time using the MS Office Excel. Traffic data from two adjacent loop stations were plotted one
pair at a time for the visual analysis.

4.4

Data Preparation
Traffic volume and speed data were normalized to increase the efficiency in model

development process. This normalization was performed by dividing each flow value by a
predetermined maximum value for the respective flow variable. A maximum freeway lane
volume of 2,200 vphpl was used to normalize the traffic volume data. A few individual
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vehicles could cruise above 100 mph on a freeway at any given moment. However, a fleet of
vehicles may not travel above 100 mph passing a single freeway section for an extended
period. Since the speed of vehicles during 30 second interval was taken for the average speed
calculation, the average speed could be expected to be less than 100 mph for the majority of
time. Therefore, a maximum speed of 100 mph was used in normalizing 30 second average
speed data. Since occupancy is expressed as a percentage of time that loops were occupied
by vehicles, the average occupancy during 30 second interval was used without any
modifications in the model development process.
The four freeway geometric variables, entrance and exit ramps and lane expansion and
merger information, considered were included as four different inputs. Possible scenarios
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Figure 11. Distribution of Afternoon NB Occupancy on I-880 on February 16, 1993

for the freeway geometric variables were divided into two categories: ‘present’ (Yes), and
‘not present’ (No). For example, if an entrance ramp is ‘present’ between two adjacent loop
stations, the linguistic value of the entrance ramp input variable was taken as ‘Yes.’ On the
other hand, if an entrance ramp is ‘not present’ between the two loop stations, the linguistic
value of the entrance ramp input variable was taken as ‘No.’ This linguistic code for the
freeway geometric information was then transferred into binary code as shown in Table 1.
Once the accuracy of the freeway incident data was established, all the incidents
occurred and traffic data gathered during September 27 - October 29, 1993 were selected for
model development. Both morning and afternoon traffic data were used from station pairs
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Table 1. Data Transformation for Geometric Variables
Geometric Variable
Between Two Stations

Type of Code
Linguistic

Binary

Yes

1

No

0

Yes

1

No

0

Yes

1

No

0

Yes

1

No

0

Entrance ramp

Exit ramp

Lane expansions

Lane merges

where actual incidents occurred on a given day. From this pool of traffic data, about 90
percent was selected for training on a purely random basis. Total of 13,718 training traffic
patterns were selected of which 3,218 belonged to ‘incident present’ patterns. The other 10
percent (1,840 patterns) of the data were used to test the model during the training process.
The testing data included 532 incident present patterns.
Traffic flow and incident data collected during the February 16 through March 19,
1993 were used in the evaluation and comparison of the ANN model results. The data for the
evaluation and comparison phase were extracted and verified in a similar manner as previously
described. Total of 9,818 traffic flow patterns were selected of which 2,231 belonged to
‘incident present’ traffic conditions.
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CHAPTER 5
MODEL DEVELOPMENT

5.1

Model Inputs
The California and Minnesota algorithms identified occupancy as the single most

important variable in automatic incident detection system. Nevertheless, recent studies
(Presaud and Hall 1989; Cheu and Ritchie 1994; Stephanedes and Liu 1995) have shown that
including traffic volume in the detection system increased the overall accuracy and reliability
of the AID systems. Cheu and Ritchie (1994) reported that adding traffic speed variable in
his models did not increase the accuracy considerably. However, Hsiao (1994) used traffic
volume, speed, and occupancy as inputs in a model that was based on fuzzy and neural
network theories. Apparently, several researchers have used different combination of traffic
variables in AID systems based on their professional judgment in the input variable selection
process. It is conceivable that traffic speed changes between upstream and downstream ends
of an incident. This means that the traffic speed can be selected as yet another input for the
AID systems. Therefore, traffic volume, speed, and occupancy variables were utilized as
model inputs in this study. Moreover, freeway geometric information was also used as inputs
on selected models.
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5.1.1 Traffic Flow Variables
When an incident occurs on a freeway section, vehicle carrying capacity of the section
temporarily reduces. This reduced capacity creates a hindrance to the normal traffic flow by
changing volume, speed, and occupancy both upstream and downstream of the incident
location. Therefore, the traffic flow variables from two stations are the best candidates
(compared to data from a single station) for incident detection model inputs.
The traffic flow data from each lane were averaged across all lanes at each loop
station during 30 second intervals. The data from adjacent loop stations were normalized as
mentioned in section 4.4 before utilizing in the model development process. This was
necessary to expedite the ANN model training process. Under normal traffic conditions, a
vehicle traveling at 40 mph on the freeway takes about 85 seconds to pass two farthest
(maximum spacing of 3300 feet) loop stations. That means, upstream traffic flow at time t-2
and downstream traffic flow at time t best includes a continuous mass of traffic flow.
Therefore, traffic flow data at least from time intervals t, t-1, and t-2 at upstream station were
used in this study. In some model architectures, however, traffic data up to time interval t-4
at upstream station and up to time interval t-2 at downstream station were used. This line of
reasoning is consistent with the research conducted by Cheu and Ritchie (1994) and Abdulhai
and Ritchie (1997).

5.1.2 Geometric Variables
When a freeway section expands, the added capacity after the expansion may yield
reduced average lane volume and occupancy across all lanes. Under normal traffic flow
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conditions, average downstream volume and occupancy will be less than that at upstream. In
contrast, when a freeway section contracts (by merging lanes), the reduced capacity after the
merger may yield higher average volume and occupancy across all lanes. This reduced
capacity close to downstream station may create recurrent congestion (or bottleneck)
between the two stations under heavy traffic conditions. Under normal traffic flow conditions,
the average downstream lane volume and occupancy will be greater than that at upstream.
This illustrates the fact that traffic flow can be affected by means other than incident
conditions. Therefore, the effect of these geometric variables on traffic flow should be
characterized in the AID models. Effect of entrance and exit ramps, in between two adjacent
stations, on traffic flow was represented in the models developed in this study. Earlier models
(Hsiao 1994; Stephanedes and Liu 1995), however, did not have these geometric information
as model inputs.
This line of reasoning may be expanded to include other freeway and environmental
data such as gradient, horizontal and vertical curves, weather condition (dry vs rainy), light
condition, mix of traffic (i.e., percentage of passenger cars, trucks, and other vehicle types),
etc. However, an extensive database that includes these variables could not be found at the
present time to investigate the suitability of these as model inputs.

5.2

Model Output
In this research, ANN were designed to identify traffic conditions from the model

inputs, and classify the conditions either as ‘incident present’ or ‘incident free.’ During
supervised model training, this linguistic desired output was transformed into a binary output.
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That is ‘incident present’ and ‘incident free’ conditions were translated as ‘1’ and ‘0,’
respectively. Since the desired model output is in binary format, only a single output layer
neuron was needed in each of the ANN architectures developed. While preparing independent
data sets for the model development (training, testing, and evaluation), ‘incident present’
condition (or ‘1’) was used during the entire incident period as reported in the incident
database while ‘incident free’ condition (or ‘0’) was used at other times.
A linear activation function was used in the output layer neuron in all the models.
Since the desired output is either ‘0’ or ‘1’, the model was forced to yield values within [0,1]
range. Actual output value less than or equal to 0.5 was interpreted as ‘0’ (or ‘incident free’)
and outputs greater than 0.5 was interpreted as ‘1’ (or ‘incident present’) during model
development.

5.3

ANN Software
ANN software used in the model development was “Professional Version Basis of AI

Backprop.” The software can model networks with feed forward and recurrent features. It
is programed in C++ language under ‘Linux’ operating system. The software can read input
pattern files saved in ASCII text format with values separated by a single space. Input
patterns need to be saved in different lines in the text file. The known limitation on the number
of input patterns is that each line containing input pattern values has to be less than 255
characters. The professional version of the software uses 32-bit binary arithmetic which is
about four times faster than 16-bit student version. Several activation functions are
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supported in the software: smooth Sigmoid, tanh, x and y (where x runs from -1 to 1 and y
runs from 0 to 1), linear, and Gaussian functions.

5.4

Network Architectures
A best ANN model should be able to store hidden relationships common to a group

of inputs, which may not be seen by a human eye. These relationships in ANN are stored in
a form of weights and bias information. This phenomena is also known as network
‘generalization.’ Generalizations are very important in applications when a network is also
required to make predictions for input patterns that are not in the training data. Several
researches have discussed advantages of overdetermined ANN models that generalizes
(Carpenter and Hoffman 1997). In contrary to the generalization, a network that is too
complex may fit the noise, not just the signal patterns, leading to a situation known as
‘overfitting.’ Overfitting is especially not warranted in an application of this sort since it can
easily lead to ANN predictions that are far beyond the range of the training data, and can even
yield wild predictions (SAS 1998). In the incident detection scenario, the training data can
include so little information and different patterns that inputs may not contain all possible
traffic and freeway geometric conditions. Therefore, generalization of the ANN models is
very important when using the models under a variety of situations.
The problem in hand more-or-less specifies the number of inputs and outputs required.
During model development process, many ANN researchers face with two basic questions:
how many hidden layers are needed? and how many hidden layer neurons are needed? Despite
few suggestions and guidelines on selecting number of hidden layers and hidden layer neurons
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proposed by different researchers, a universal rule or set of equations that dictates the ideal
number of hidden layers or hidden layer neurons in an ANN model does not exist to date.
Haykin (1993) recommends using double hidden layer ANNs claiming that the first hidden
layer extracts local features while the second hidden layer extracts global features of the input
patterns. Few other researches (Sontag 1992; Surkan and Singleton 1990) also argue that
double hidden layer ANNs provide better results. On the other hand, Lawrence (1993) argue
to use a single hidden layer stating that more than a single hidden layer may significantly
increase the training time. Experimental work by Villiers and Barnard (1992) showed that
double hidden layer networks are only more prone to fall into bad local minima. Due to these
controversial opinions on the best number of hidden layers, both single hidden layer and
double hidden layer networks were developed on a trial and error basis.
ANN with too few hidden layer neurons will not be able to learn enough from training
data. On the other hand, too many hidden neurons will allow the network to memorize the
training data without generalizing from the training set for unforeseen patterns. Some text
books and articles offer “rule of thumb” for choosing number of hidden neurons. Lawrence
(1993) recommends starting with a number of hidden layer neurons that is less than the
number of inputs plus the number of outputs divided by two. Then after training the network
should be tested with a testing data which is independent from training data. Lawrence (1993)
recommends adding a few hidden neurons at a time and repeat the process until the training
error is decreased to a point where no further decrease in error can be achieved. General
consensus among many ANN professionals recognize that these rules may fail in many
situations than they succeed (SAS 1998; Tveter 1997). At present the only sure way to
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know the best number of hidden layers and number of hidden layer neurons is the trial and
error approach as utilized by Cheu and Ritchie (1994) and Abdulhai and Ritchie (1995).
In this study, two different ANN groups were tested for incident detection accuracies.
The first network group tested included eight different network architectures that transmit
input information from input layer to its output layer (feed forward). This information flow
occurs only in the forward direction. The second network group tested included eight
different network architectures with a combination of transmitting information from input
layer to output layer through hidden layers (feed forward structure) and from output layer
directly back into the input layer (recurrent loop structure). The recurrent loop was setup
from the output layer neuron to an input layer node. Both network architectures were trained
with a backpropagation error correction method using the “Professional Basis of AI
Backprop” software discussed in section 5.3. The sigmoid activation function was used in
every hidden layer neuron and the linear activation function was used in the output layer
neuron.

5.4.1 Feed Forward Networks
The behavior of feed forward networks were discussed in section 3.2.1. A feed
forward network can have as many hidden layers as desired. Cheu and Ritchie (1994) and
Stephanedes and Liu (1995) only considered single hidden layer networks. However, no
credible reasoning was given as to why networks with more than one hidden layer were not
tested for incident detection. In this research, ANN models with single and double hidden
layers were tested to investigate whether this additional hidden layer would enhance detection
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performance and eventually lead to a better incident detection model. Each model consisted
of single input layer, single or double hidden layers, and single output layer. Total of eight
ANN model architectures with feed forward structures were developed. Each model
architecture represented a different input feature set or different hidden layer combinations
as shown in Table 2. They were named by the model number and the way network process
information.
The training process started with a single hidden layer networks with 18 input
neurons, a minimum of 8 hidden layer neurons, and a single output neuron. Model weights
and bias were initialized using a random number generator that has a mean of ‘0’ and a
standard deviation of ‘1.’ The ANN was trained with training data up to 5000 epoches (or
iterations or cycles) using backpropagation technique available in the AI software. While the
model training was in progress, model error was calculated using the test data, which were
set a side during the data preparation, at every 10 cycles. Training was continued until both
training and testing errors kept on decreasing. The training was stopped when the testing
error started to increase while the training error was still on the decreasing trend. The model
weights and bias were initialized again using a random number generator and the model was
trained again as explained. This training process with different initial weights and biases was
repeated until the standard deviation of the trained model errors remained unchanged. The
rest of the single hidden layer models were trained following the procedure described above.
Then a second hidden layer was added to the earlier model architectures and repeated the
training process. To select the best ANN model for each model type listed in Table 2, a total
of 568 feed forward ANN models were developed during the training process.
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Table 2. Model Input Variables and Nomenclature for Feed Forward Networks

Interval

Networks

Two-Hidden Layer Networks

1-F

2-F

3-F

4-F

5-F

6-F

7-F

8-F

t

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

t-1

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

t-2

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

t-3

-

x

-

x

-

x

-

x

t-4

-

x

-

x

-

x

-

x

Downstream

Single-Hidden Layer

Volume,

t

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

Speed, and

t-1

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

Occupancy

t-2

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

Geometric Information

Model Inputs

Time

Entrance Ramp

-

-

x

x

-

-

x

x

Exit Ramp

-

-

x

x

-

-

x

x

Lane Added

-

-

x

x

-

-

x

x

Lane Merger

-

-

x

x

-

-

x

x

Upstream

Volume,
Speed, and
Occupancy

Legend:

x

- Input was included in the model

(-)

- Input was not included in the model

F

- Feed forward network

The architectures of these non-linear feed forward ANN models developed are shown
in Figures 12 through 19. For a given initial random weights and bias, a single hidden layer
model with 18 input units and 8 hidden neurons took about 8-hours to be trained in a Pentium
166 Mhz with a 32 MB of RAM memory. The training time increased exponentially as the
number of network connections (weights and bias) increased.
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Figure 12. Model 1-F :- Feed Forward ANN with Single-Hidden Layer and 18 Input
Variables.
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Figure 13. Model 2-F :- Feed Forward ANN with Single-Hidden Layer and 24 Input
Variables.
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Figure 14. Model 3-F :- Feed Forward ANN with Single-Hidden Layer and 22 Input
Variables.
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Figure 15. Model 4-F :- Feed Forward ANN with Single-Hidden Layer and 28 Input
Variables.
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Figure 16. Model 5-F :- Feed Forward ANN with Two-Hidden Layers and 18 Input
Variables.
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Figure 17. Model 6-F :- Feed Forward ANN with Two-Hidden Layers and 24 Input
Variables.
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Figure 18. Model 7-F :- Feed Forward ANN with Two-Hidden Layers and 22 Input
Variables.
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Figure 19. Model 8-F :- Feed Forward ANN with Two-Hidden Layers and 28 Input
Variables.
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5.4.2 Recurrent Networks
Recurrent networks have been in use in other areas of transportation engineering such
as automated car controls (Neusser et al. 1991), and modeling schedule deviation of buses
(Kalaputapu and Demetsky 1995). Effect of traffic condition (‘incident free’ or ‘incident
present’) during previous time interval on that at current time interval was studied in this
network architecture. The network was a combination of feed forward structure and a
recurrent loop that ran from the output layer neuron to a new input layer neuron. ANN’s
prediction on traffic condition based on the input patterns at previous time step was rerouted
from the output neuron to the input layer through the recurrent loop.
The recurrent networks developed in this study had an extra input node compared to
its counterpart feed forward networks that were discussed in the previous section. ANN
models with recurrent loop architecture were trained and tested utilizing the same procedure
discussed in the previous section. The input combinations used in the model development and
their nomenclature are listed in Table 3. The recurrent models developed in the study are
shown in Figures 20 through 24.
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Table 3. Model Input Variables and Nomenclature for Recurrent Networks

Interval

Networks

Two-Hidden Layer Networks

2-R

3-R

4-R

5-R

6-R

7-R

8-R

t

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

t-1

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

t-2

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

t-3

-

x

-

x

-

x

-

x

t-4

-

x

-

x

-

x

-

x

Volume,

t

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

Speed, and

t-1

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

Occupancy

t-2

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

Entrance Ramp

-

-

x

x

-

-

x

x

Exit Ramp

-

-

x

x

-

-

x

x

Lane Added

-

-

x

x

-

-

x

x
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-

-

x

x

-

-

x

x

Upstream

1-R
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Geometric Information

Model Inputs
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Occupancy

Legend:

x
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Figure 20. Model 1-R :- Recurrent ANN with Single-Hidden Layer and 18 Input Variables.
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Figure 21. Model 2-R :- Recurrent ANN with Single-Hidden Layer and 24 Input Variables.
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Figure 22. Model 3-R :- Recurrent ANN with Single-Hidden Layer and 22 Input Variables.
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Figure 23. Model 4-R :- Recurrent ANN with Single-Hidden Layer and 28 Input Variables.
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Figure 24. Model 5-R :- Recurrent ANN with Two-Hidden Layers and 18 Input Variables.
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Figure 25. Model 6-R :- Recurrent ANN with Double-Hidden Layer and 24 Input Variables.
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Figure 26. Model 7-R :- Recurrent ANN with Double-Hidden Layer and 22 Input Variables.
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Figure 27. Model 8-R :- Recurrent ANN with Double-Hidden Layer and 28 Input Variables.
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CHAPTER 6
PERFORMANCE MEASURES AND TRAINING RESULTS

6.1

Performance Evaluators of AID Models
AID models developed so far primarily depend on traffic data collected from inductive

loop detectors buried under pavements. The data collected during predetermined time
intervals (e.g., 20 sec, 30 sec, 60sec, etc.) is then averaged at a Traffic Management Center
(TMC). Depending on the detection model requirements, the traffic data may be averaged for
each individual lane or over all lanes in each direction. Each set of traffic data pertaining to
a single time interval is referred to as a traffic pattern. When the processed traffic pattern and
other types of data (for example; information about presence of exit and entrance ramps,
change in number of lanes, or weather condition, etc.) are used as model inputs, the input data
combination is referred as an input pattern in the discussion.
A trained automatic incident detection method (AIDM) [whether the method is either
a network model such as ANN or an algorithm such as California algorithm] has stored
signatures on ‘incident present’ and ‘incident free’ conditions. Once an input pattern is
produced to such an AIDM, it determines whether the given input signature pattern belongs
or closely resembles to either ‘incident present’ or ‘incident free’ signature conditions. If the
AIDM’s determination is that the input signature belongs or closely resembles to a signature
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with ‘incident present’ condition, then the output of AIDM is interpreted as a ‘1,’ (as in the
this study) indicating incident traffic condition. Otherwise, the output of AIDM is interpreted
as a ‘0,’ indicating an incident free normal traffic condition. (Different methods may use other
ways of representing the traffic condition: ‘2’ instead of ‘1’ to represent ‘incident present’
condition and ‘1’ instead of ‘0’ to represent ‘incident free’ condition.) One may choose to
issue an incident alarm just as the AIDM detects the incident condition. If an incident
condition exists in the actual traffic flow and the AIDM recognizes the incident condition, the
AIDM is said to have detected the incident pattern (or signature). On the other hand, if the
actual traffic flow is incident free and AIDM recognizes it as an incident condition, the AIDM
is said to have detected a false incident. The goal of any AIDM is to detect as many incident
patterns as possible while lowering the number of false incidents detected. Typically, the
performance of AIDM is measured by detection rate, false alarm rate, and mean time to detect
incidents. The detection rate measures the ability of AIDM to detect actual incidents. The
false alarm rate measures the rate at which AIDM makes false incident detection. Speed and
efficiency of AIDM in detecting actual incidents are measured by the mean time to detect
incidents.

6.1.1 Conventional Detection Rate
A careful review of the literature revealed that previous researchers have used a
conventional detection rate with the following definition:
DR =

TID
TISD

(21)
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where DR is the detection rate, TID is the total number of incidents detected by the AIDM,
and TISD is the total number of incidents in the sample database.
Even though this definition implies a capability of an AIDM to detect incidents, it may
not characterize the true ability and performance of AIDM in detecting incident patterns. For
example, if the AIDM detects incident conditions at least once in 90 of 100 incidents, the
estimated detection rate according to the above definition is 90%. An ideal AIDM should be
able to distinguish every incident pattern from incident-free patterns. If the goal of training
an AIDM is just to identify incident conditions at least once sometime during an incident, the
model may not be able to distinguish majority of the incident patterns during training.
Moreover, the AIDM may not be able to detect majority of incident patterns during
implementation as well. To overcome this dilemma, DR can be modified to evaluate AIDM’s
performance in detecting incident patterns rather than just a mere number of incidents.

6.1.2 Modified Detection Rate
It should be noted that for a given input pattern, AIDMs can only detect whether an
incident condition exist or not. They (at least the AIDMs that have been developed so far)
cannot detect whether single or multiple incidents have occurred in the freeway section.
Therefore, when measuring the AIDM’s performance of detecting incidents, a more realistic
gauge should be utilized. Depending on the severity of an incident, traffic may be affected for
a few minutes to several hours. Traffic data collected during this period would yield tens,
hundreds, or even thousands of traffic patterns that reflect incident conditions. When AIDM
is being used in a TMC, traffic operators will receive an incident alarm as an incident is
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detected. Since the AIDM is designed to detect incident patterns and issue incident alarms,
the AIDM should at least continue to issue incident alarms until the incident is cleared (in this
case until traffic becomes normal). To the traffic operator, continuous alarms would indicate
the duration and severity effects of the incident.
Therefore, a modified detection rate based on detected incident patterns that may
better reflect the actual application of an AIDM in a TMC environment was proposed in the
study. The proposed performance measure would capture the traffic operator’s experience
with an AIDM in a more realistic manner. The modified detection rate is defined by:
DRIP =

TIPD
TIPSD

(22)

where DRIP is the detection rate of incident patterns, TIPD is the total number of incident
patterns detected by the AIDM, and TIPSD is the total number of incident patterns in the
sample database.
The importance of this definition can be illustrated with the earlier example. Suppose
the 100 incidents have 5,000 incident patters in total and that the AIDM detects a single
incident pattern each (just enough to issue incident alarms) in 90 incidents, the detection
performance based on the modified ratio, DRIP, is estimated to be 1.8%. However, if the
model detects 40 incident patterns each in 90 incidents, the detection performance is increased
to 72%. Even though the conventional DR in both situations would be 90%, the DRIP can
capture the detection performance measure in a more realistic manner. That shows that the
DRIP truly measures the detection performance of the model.
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6.1.3 Other Performance Measures
The other important measures in use to assess AIDM performance are the false alarm
rate (FAR) and mean time to detect incidents (MTD). A false alarm is said to have occurred
if the AIDM issues an incident alarm when an incident free condition is reported in the
database. The FAR is defined as follows:

FAR =

TFA
NTA

(23)

where FAR is the false alarm rate of the AIDM, TFA is the total number of false alarms
issued by the AIDM, and NTA is the total number of times the AIDM was applied.
Cheu and Ritchie (1994) proposed a slightly different version of FAR. Instead of
estimating the false alarm rates for the entire database with several incidents, the author
proposed an estimate of false alarms per detected incident (FAPDI), and used the FAPDI to
find best ANNs for a given number of hidden layer neurons in the author’s study. To be
consistent with the performance measures in model training, testing, and evaluation phases,
the FAR defined in the equation 23 was used to estimate false alarm rates throughout this
study.
Upon receiving an incident alarm from the AIDM, if the TMC operators dispatch
emergency response team (police, fire rescue, ambulance, and tow trucks, etc.) to the field
and finds that the incident alarm is fault, the time and cost associated with the effort is totally
wasted. Moreover, the TMC operators and those involved in the emergency rescue team
would have less confidence on the AIDM should it results more and more false alarms.
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Therefore, false alarms are considered more serious type of error than the error of not
detecting an actual incident condition.
The time between the actual occurrence of incident and the time it is detected by an
AIDM is a measure of how fast the AIDM is in detecting incidents. It is important that this
time gap is kept to a minimum for an efficient incident response. The mean time to detect
(MTD) incidents is estimated by summing up the time an AIDM takes from actual occurrence
of an incident to issue an incident alarm and then dividing it by the total number of detected
incidents in the database as follows.
MTD =

STT
TISD

(24)

where MTD is the mean time to detect an incident in the field, STT is the summation of total
time AIDM takes to detect each incident, and the TISD is the total number of incidents in the
sample database.

6.1.4 Persistence Checks
Often times, when an AIDM detects an incident condition in the traffic flow,
researchers prefer AIDM to wait for a certain time interval to issue an incident alarm. If the
detected incident condition persists for a predetermined time period (e.g., for 60, 90, or 120
seconds), then the AIDM is allowed to issue an incident alarm. During the predetermined
period, AIDM may issue either incident free or tentative incident condition. This process of
delaying incident alarms is also known as persistence checks. Persistence check is devised
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essentially to reduce false alarms. As a by-product, however, persistence check reduces the
detection rate as well.

6.2

ANN Model Training Results
Sixteen different ANN architectures were developed with traffic flow and geometric

variables as inputs. The learning rate of the models was varied between 0.04 and 0.06 and the
momentum term was varied between 0.9 and 0.7 in different training sessions to optimize
training of each model. The training coefficients are in the same order of magnitude compared
to previous ANN studies on incident detection. When selecting a best model for a given
network architecture (i.e., for a given number of input nodes, hidden layers, and neurons in
each hidden layer) the model was trained with different initial weights that were randomly
assigned. Depending upon the error curve of the model and the location of the initial weights
on the curve, training may land the model in a local minima (despite using a momentum term)
or in the global minima (the desired location for the model to land at the end of training). To
ensure that the model results did not come from a trained model stuck in a local minima, each
model was trained with different initial weight combinations until the error of the trained
model became stable. The model training with different initial weights continued until the
standard deviation of the error of trained models became stable. For model 3-F with 12
neurons in a single hidden layer, this result is listed in Table 5.
The first column indicates the number of model training trials with different initial
weights. The number of each instance when the model did not detect an actual incident
pattern or detected an incident condition in absence of an actual incident condition was
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Table 5. Training Results for 3-F model with 12 Hidden Neurons
Model

Conventional

Detection Rate of

False Alarm

Number

Detection Rate (DR)

Incident Patterns (DRIP)

Rate (FAR)

1

100%

90.37%

1.12%

2

100%

89.68%

3

100%

4

Standard Deviation

Coefficient of

of Error Rate

Variation of Error Rate

0.0338

-

-

1.17%

0.0359

-

-

89.81%

1.06%

0.0346

-

-

95.65%

89.43%

0.95%

0.0343

-

-

5

100%

90.15%

1.14%

0.0345

-

-

6

100%

89.19%

0.95%

0.0348

0.0007

0.0207

7

100%

90.02%

1.06%

0.0340

0.0007

0.0201

8

100%

89.96%

1.06%

0.0341

0.0007

0.0192

9

100%

90.09%

1.08%

0.0340

0.0006

0.0185

10

100%

90.06%

1.15%

0.0348

0.0006

0.0178

11

100%

90.21%

1.14%

0.0343

0.0006

0.0169

12

100%

89.93%

1.09%

0.0345

0.0006

0.0162

13

100%

90.06%

1.12%

0.0345

0.0005

0.0155

14

100%

89.96%

1.09%

0.0344

0.0005

0.0149
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Error Rate

estimated. This number was divided by the number of times that the model was applied to
calculate the error rate for each model trained with different initial weights. Since model
training was to continue until the standard deviation of the error rate became stable and the
mean of error rate could change from n models to n+1 models, establishing a common ground
was necessary to compare the change in the standard deviation as training continued with
more initial weight combinations. Therefore, instead of comparing standard deviation of the
error rate itself, a coefficient of variation was estimated for comparison purposes. The
coefficient of variation of the error rate in the nth row under the ‘model number’ column (in
Table 5) means that the coefficient was estimated from 1st through nth models. The coefficient
of variation from 1st through 6th models and 1st through 14th models remains very small.
Furthermore, the standard deviation of the error rate remains very small from 1st through 6th
models and 1st through 14th models. The model (in this case model 1) with the minimum error
rate was selected as the best model for the single hidden layer with 12 neurons.
As discussed in section 5.3, each model type (e.g., model type 3-F) was tested with
different number of hidden layer neurons until model performance did not indicate a
significant gain with the added neurons. For a given model type, the best network for each
hidden layer neuron combination was selected by comparing the error rate as described above.
Tables 6 and 7 list the selected models from single and double hidden layer architectures,
respectively. Each row in the Tables 6 and 7 represents the best hidden layer neuron
combination for each model type that exhibited the best performance. For example, in Table
6 the best 4-F network selected had 18 hidden layer neurons with a DRIP of 91.64% and
FAR of 2.30%.
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Table 6. Selected Single Hidden Layer Models During Training
Model Architecture

No of Hidden Layer

DRIP

FAR

Error Rate

Neurons
Feed Forward Networks
1-F

10

59.79%

0.01%

0.0945

2-F

20

81.82%

0.46%

0.0472

3-F

12

90.37%

1.12%

0.0338

4-F

18

91.64%

2.30%

0.0426

Recurrent Networks
1-R

10

91.30%

2.22%

0.0426

2-R

12

90.65%

1.41%

0.0361

3-R

12

90.02%

1.16%

0.0350

4-R

15

90.43%

1.61%

0.0386

In general, a model may experience two types of errors: detecting incident patterns
when there is no incident, and not detecting an incident pattern when there is an incident
pattern. These model errors cause reliability problems in practical applications. Therefore,
when selecting a best ANN model, both errors should be taken into consideration to increase
the AIDM’s overall reliability. Estimated model error rates in Tables 6 and 7 reflect both of
these error types. Selection of the best model was based on the error rate. A model with
minimum error rate which maintains a reasonable DRIP was selected as a best ANN model
to detect freeway incidents.
The output of an ANN model is usually processed with a threshold or tolerance. If the
output was greater than a certain threshold (this value was taken as 0.5 in this study), an
‘incident present’ condition was said to have detected. By varying this threshold value,
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Table 7. Selected Double Hidden Layer Models During Training
Model Architecture

No of Hidden Layer Neurons
1st Layer

DRIP

FAR

Error
Rate

2nd Layer

Feed Forward Networks
5-F

8

2

90.49%

0.67%

0.0290

6-F

16

4

92.14%

1.14%

0.0299

7-F

22

2

94.22%

1.35%

0.0270

8-F

12

2

94.38%

1.14%

0.0246

Recurrent Networks
5-R

10

2

90.21%

2.49%

0.0479

6-R

22

2

91.45%

1.06%

0.0306

7-R

12

3

88.97%

0.93%

0.0351

8-R

8

3

97.17%

2.40%

0.0306

different performance levels can be estimated for AIDMs. The affect of the threshold value
on model results can be analyzed in a form of curves known as performance envelops. For the
models developed in this study, the performance curves at the end of training process are
shown in Figures 25 through 27. These curves were developed by gradually varying the
threshold value and analyzing the traffic condition output from each model. This calculation
was performed using a program written in ‘C-language’ once the model outputs were
available for the training data.
From the training results for single hidden layer ANNs shown in Table 6 and Figure
28, the 3-F model exhibits the overall lowest error rate and best performance. The feed
forward model 1-F with upstream and downstream traffic data up to t-2 time intervals did not
perform well during the training. Adding the upstream traffic data up to t-4 time intervals
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have shown a little improvement in model 2-F over model 1-F. Adding geometric variables
in the model 3-F seems to have improved the model performance. However, including
upstream traffic data up to t-4 time intervals and geometric variables in model 4-F have not
shown much improvement in overall performance. Similar observations can be made from the
Table 6 for single hidden layer models with recurrent loops. Yet the best training performance
is exhibited by model 3-F.
Table 7 indicates that adding geometric inputs in the model had a positive impact on
the detection. The lowest error rate in double hidden layer architecture was exhibited by the
feed forward model 8-F that utilize all traffic and geometric variables. Further, the added
recurrent loop did not have any significant improvement in the recurrent models (except
models 1-R and 2-R). Comparison between single and double hidden layer networks portrays
that the double hidden layer networks perform better than the single hidden layer networks
in freeway incident detection.

6.3

Calibration of Conventional Algorithms
California algorithm no. 8 and Minnesota algorithm utilize occupancy data from

upstream and downstream stations and set of threshold values to detect incidents. Therefore,
these two algorithms were used to compare the performance results of ANN models. In order
to avoid any bias for the threshold values from previous publications and the data used, the
same training data used to train ANN models were used to calibrate the two algorithms. To
keep the algorithms on the same level of application, these algorithms were calibrated as non
station specific algorithms.
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Figure 28. Performance Envelope for Single Hidden Layer Feed Forward Networks
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Figure 29. Performance Envelope for Single Hidden Layer Recurrent Networks
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Figure 30. Performance Envelope for Double Hidden Layer Feed Forward Networks

97

8.00%

100.00%

98.00%

96.00%

94.00%

92.00%

5-R
90.00%

6-R
88.00%

7-R

8-R

86.00%

84.00%

82.00%

80.00%
0.00%

1.00%

2.00%

3.00%

4.00%

5.00%

6.00%

7.00%

FAR %

Figure 31. Performance Envelope for Double Hidden Layer Recurrent Networks
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8.00%

6.3.1 California Algorithm
2:07 PM

To calibrate the California algorithm, 60 second occupancy averages were

used at 30 second intervals. Since the algorithm has five thresholds, a large number of
threshold values were required to cover possible combinations including and beyond ranges
and magnitudes reported by Payne and Tignor (1978) and Arceneaux, et al. (1990). A
program was written in ‘C- language’ to calibrate the algorithm using the training data used
in ANN model training process. The threshold combinations that produced the lower error
rates are listed in the Table 8. Threshold combination that yielded the lowest error rate was
selected for model evaluation.

6.3.2 Minnesota Algorithm
Since the Minnesota algorithm only utilize two threshold values, the search for
threshold value combinations was less arduous than for the California algorithm. Traffic data
from ANN training was used to calculate the RAT1 and RAT2 values. Threshold values
reported by Stephanedes and Chassiakos (1993) was used as a guide to establish a range of
possible threshold combinations. A program was written in ‘C-language’ to search for various
possible threshold combinations and the results are listed in the Table 9. The threshold
combination that yielded the lowest error rate was selected for evaluating performance results
with ANN models.
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Table 8. Calibration Results for California Algorithm No. 8
Threshold Sets

DRIP

FAR

Error
Rate

No.

T1

T2

T3

T4

T5

1

10.0

-0.500

0.010

20.0

20

75.57%

2.58%

0.0831

2

9.8

0.635

0.078

12.2

30

55.81%

2.41%

0.1278

3

13.4

-0.286

0.312

15.8

30

52.81%

2.58%

0.1367

4

5.0

-0.500

0.010

10.0

20

50.12%

2.57%

0.1427

5

10.0

-0.500

0.010

10.0

20

44.93%

2.17%

0.1509

6

15.0

-0.500

0.010

20.0

20

41.55%

2.26%

0.1597

7

15.8

0.645

0.248

15.2

30

37.94%

1.28%

0.1583

8

15.0

-0.500

0.010

10.0

20

34.34%

1.87%

0.1727

6.3.3 Discussion
During the calibration process of both algorithms, several thousands of threshold sets
were tested for incident detection performance. Some threshold sets yielded similar
performance measures in terms of DRIP. Under these circumstances, the threshold sets that
resulted in lower FAR were selected for the evaluation process discussed in Chapter 7. The
performance envelope for California algorithm and Minnesota algorithm during the calibration
process for the selected threshold sets is shown in Figure 32. Table 9 and Figure 32 suggest
that the Minnesota algorithm performs better than the California algorithm during calibration.
These two algorithms with the listed threshold sets were used in the ANN model evaluation
to establish the performance gain of ANN models.
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Table 9. Calibration Results for Minnesota Algorithm
Threshold Sets

6.4

DRIP

FAR

Error Rate

No.

T1

T2

1

0.20

0.20

76.35%

1.15%

0.0670

2

0.25

0.15

73.93%

0.51%

0.0663

3

0.25

0.20

71.47%

0.24%

0.0693

4

0.25

0.25

68.71%

0.24%

0.0758

5

0.30

0.15

64.67%

0.09%

0.0838

6

0.30

0.20

62.37%

0.09%

0.0892

7

0.30

0.25

59.91%

0.09%

0.0949

8

0.30

0.30

59.23%

0.08%

0.0964

Summary
Total of sixteen artificial neural networks were developed for freeway incident

detection. Of the total, eight were based on feed forward architecture with single and double
hidden layer models. The remaining eight models were based on recurrent architecture with
single and double hidden layers. Eight different input combinations were used in the sixteen
different models. The input combinations included traffic volume, speed, and occupancy data
from t to t-4 time intervals at upstream stations, traffic volume, speed, and occupancy data
from t to t-2 time intervals at downstream stations, and freeway geometric information
(presence of entrance and exit ramps and lane expansions and mergers).
The models were trained and tested using a “A1 Backprop” software. Model training
was started with random initial weights and the training was continued testing error started
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Figure 32. Performance Envelope for the California and Minnesota Algorithms.
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to increase while training error was still in the decreasing trend. Each architecture type was
trained with varying the number of hidden layer neurons. The best models was selected based
on the lowest error rate calculated during the training process. Model training results
suggested that model 8-F had the overall best performance with 94.38% of incident patterns
detected at a 1.14% false alarm rate.
The California and Minnesota algorithms were also calibrated with the data used to
train ANN models. Large number of possible threshold sets were tested during this calibration
process. The threshold sets that resulted in lower overall error rate were selected for
comparative evaluation of ANN model results.
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CHAPTER 7
RESULTS OF MODEL EVALUATION

During model development process, a training data set was used to train ANN models
and a testing data set was used to test each model as the training progressed. Once different
ANN models were developed, the model that exhibited a better overall performance was
selected as the best candidate model for freeway incident detection. The elaborate process of
model development through best model selection is discussed in great detail in sections 5.4
and 6.2. Third phase of this model development procedure is the model evaluation (or
validation). In the context of this study, model evaluation is referred to as the process by
which a trained AIDM is assessed for its incident detection performance using a data set that
is independent of the training and testing data set. In this chapter, evaluation process of the
models developed in Chapter 5 is discussed.

7.1

Evaluation Data
A data set different from that used in training and testing process was used in the

model evaluation process. Traffic data collected during February 16 - March 19, 1993 from
I-880 freeway as described in Chapter 4 were scrutinized for any abnormalities in traffic flow
data. The incident database corresponding to the February 16 through March 19, 1993 period
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had 1,210 incident records collected during 6:30am-9:30am and 3:30pm-6:30pm. A total of
9,818 traffic patterns were used in the evaluation process.

7.2

Neural Network Models
The best recurrent ANN models in each architecture type developed in Chapter 6 were

evaluated for their performance with an independent field data set. Performance measures
such as DRIP, FAR, error rate, and MTD were estimated for the models listed in Tables 6 and
7. Moreover, model performance was estimated with 1 to 3 persistent checks.
Table 10 lists the performance results for single hidden layer feed forward models with
persistent checks. Comparison of these models revealed that 1-F, 2-F, and 3-F had lower
error rates than during training. Model 3-F exhibited an increase in both DRIP and FAR
levels. Even though the FAR of model 3-F increased during evaluation, it could be further
reduced from 0.98% to 0.61% with application of three persistence checks. As can be seen
from the Table 10, when persistence check was introduced to the model output, both FAR
and DRIP decreased across the board while MTD increased. On the other hand, model 4-F
exhibited more errors than during training. The model 4-F exhibited the worst performance
with 9.79% false alarms at while detecting 98.16% of incident patterns. Despite the use of
persistence checks, performance of the model 4-F did not improve considerably.
Except 1-R recurrent model listed in Table 11, all the other single hidden layer
networks did not perform well with the evaluation data. Particularly, the 2-R model with no
persistent check had an extremely high false alarm rate compared to any ANN model in the
evaluation process. Once the persistence check was introduced to the model output, the false
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alarm rate significantly reduced from 17.81% to 5.47%. Following this drop, the MTD
increased dramatically from 5 seconds to 153 seconds. When comparing the DRIP, only 4-R
model had lower DRIP values during the evaluation.

Table 10. Evaluation Performance of Single Hidden Layer Feed Forward ANNs
Model

Persistent Check

DRIP

FAR

Error Rate

MTD (sec)

1-F

0

68.85%

0.07%

0.0715

392.1

1

68.39%

0.04%

0.0712

430.7

2

67.99%

0.01%

0.0709

458.6

3

67.57%

0.00%

0.0708

488.6

0

79.02%

4.40%

0.0917

280

1

78.94%

3.56%

0.0832

293.4

2

78.85%

2.84%

0.0761

306.7

3

78.76%

2.22%

0.0699

321.7

0

95.25%

0.98%

0.0206

116.7

1

95.22%

0.83%

0.0190

140

2

95.18%

0.71%

0.0179

170

3

95.13%

0.61%

0.0169

200

0

98.16%

9.79%

0.1021

20

1

98.15%

9.07%

0.0948

33.3

2

98.14%

8.50%

0.0891

51.7

3

98.13%

8.07%

0.0848

71.7

2-F

3-F

4-F
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Table 11. Evaluation Performance of Single Hidden Layer Recurrent ANNs
Model

Persistent Check

DRIP

FAR

Error Rate

MTD (sec)

1-R

0

94.04%

2.67%

0.0402

111.7

1

93.98%

2.45%

0.0381

145

2

93.93%

2.29%

0.0365

175

3

93.87%

2.14%

0.0349

205

0

94.98%

17.81%

0.1895

5

1

94.75%

6.86%

0.0800

95

2

94.61%

6.13%

0.0727

123.3

3

94.68%

5.47%

0.0661

153.3

0

94.40%

5.08%

0.0636
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1

94.34%

2.27%

0.0354

145

2

94.28%

2.16%

0.0343

175

3

94.23%

2.06%

0.0333

205

0

85.70%

2.75%

0.0600

46.7

1

83.95%

1.45%

0.0470

160

2

83.67%

1.22%

0.0447

186.7

3

83.37%

1.02%

0.0427

213.3

2-R

3-R

4-R

Tables 12 and 13 list evaluation performance measures for double hidden layer
networks. From the results shown in Table 12, models 5-F and 8-F performed better with the
evaluation data. Model 8-F detected more incident patterns during the evaluation than model
5-F did and even had lower false alarms. It detected incidents at an average of 83 seconds
without any persistence check. Once the persistence check was applied to model 8-F, the false
alarm rate considerably reduced from 0.99% to 0.01% while the detection of incident patterns
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did not deteriorate that much. Performance of model 5-F was not quite the same. The false
alarm rate did not reduce considerably even if persistence check was applied. Persistence
checks can effectively filter out majority false detections attributable to random fluctuations
in the traffic flow. The persistence check also delays the speedy detection of actual incident
patterns since the AIDM would not issue an incident alarm until incident conditions are
detected throughout a predetermined number of time intervals has passed.
Double hidden layer recurrent models were also examined with the evaluation data.
Results of the evaluation are listed in Table 13. Model 5-R had a slightly lower error rate and
a higher false alarm rate than during training. Among the recurrent networks, model 6-R
exhibits the best performance values during evaluation. Persistent checks had reduced the
FAR of model 6-R from 0.16% to 0.06%.

7.3

Comparative Evaluation of ANN with Conventional Algorithms
Performance of the best single and double hidden layer ANN models were compared

with those of the California algorithm no. 8 and Minnesota algorithm discussed in Chapter
2. The same data set that was used in the evaluation of ANN models was used to evaluate the
performance of these two conventional algorithms. For this comparative evaluation, the
threshold sets listed in Table 8 (in section 6.3) were used for California algorithm and
threshold sets listed in Table 9 (in section 6.3) were used for Minnesota algorithm. Table 14
lists the DRIP, FAR, error rate, and MTD of the ANN models 3-F and 8-F with the California
algorithm no. 8 and Minnesota algorithm during the evaluation. From the Table 14, it can
be seen that both ANN models detected more incident patterns than the two
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Table 12. Evaluation Performance of Double Hidden Layer Feed Forward ANNs
Model

Persistent Check

DRIP

FAR

Error Rate

MTD (sec)

5-F

0

92.74%

0.95%

0.0260

116.7

1

92.68%

0.80%

0.0245

143.3

2

92.61%

0.69%

0.0234

178.3

3

92.54%

0.62%

0.0227

208.3

0

96.68%

2.63%

0.0338

53.3

1

96.66%

2.30%

0.0306

73.3

2

96.64%

2.00%

0.0275

93.3

3

96.62%

1.75%

0.0251

116.7

0

98.07%

4.59%

0.0503

61.7

1

98.06%

4.24%

0.0468

80

2

98.05%

3.97%

0.0441

101.7

3

98.04%

3.77%

0.0421

125

0

95.43%

0.99%

0.0203

83.3

1

95.40%

0.61%

0.0165

103.3

2

95.37%

0.30%

0.0133

133.3

3

95.33%

0.01%

0.0105

156.7

6-F

7-F

8-F

conventional algorithms. Therefore, the ANN models 3-F and 8-F could detect incident free
patterns more accurately compared to the two conventional algorithms. Both ANN models
had lower error rates than the two conventional algorithms.
Performance envelopes for the ANN models 3-F and 8-F and the California and
Minnesota algorithms are shown in Figure 33. This figure clearly shows that the models 3-F
and 8-F had highest DRIP, and essentially the best overall performance of any AIDM in
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Table 13. Evaluation Performance of Double Hidden Layer Recurrent ANNs
Model

Persistent Check

DRIP

FAR

Error Rate

MTD (sec)

5-R

0

92.92%

3.14%

0.0475

138.3

1

92.86%

2.96%

0.0457

168.3

2

92.80%

2.82%

0.0443

198.3

3

92.73%

2.70%

0.0431

228.3

0

89.87%

0.16%

0.0246

178.3

1

89.71%

0.11%

0.0241

210

2

89.62%

0.08%

0.0238

240

3

89.53%

0.06%

0.0236

270

0

91.62%

1.96%

0.0386

120

1

91.55%

1.83%

0.0374

150

2

91.48%

1.79%

0.0370

180

3

91.41%

1.76%

0.0367

210

0

98.21%

6.01%

0.0642

65

1

98.20%

5.23%

0.0563

80

2

98.19%

4.74%

0.0514

96.7

3

98.18%

4.35%

0.0476
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6-R

7-R

8-R

terms of DRIP, FAR, and error rate values. The fact that both ANN models performed better
than the conventional algorithms suggest that performance of ANN models are in accordance
with the findings during the training. The best threshold value that provides best DRIP and
FAR (determined by different traffic operational personnel) can be found for each locality.
Few observations can be made about the Minnesota algorithm during the evaluation.
The Minnesota algorithm had the lowest MTD compared to the other models listed in Table

110

14. Despite a higher false alarm rate and lower DRIP, the Minnesota algorithm was sensitive
to the changes in occupancy values. During onset of an incident, such changes in occupancy
values between upstream and downstream stations are apparent. This may explain the reason
for the Minnesota algorithm’s relatively faster incident detection than other models even at
high false alarm rates.

7.4

Comparison of Conventional and Modified Detection Rates
Previous AIDM studies have been accustomed to using conventional detection rate

as described in Chapter 6 to evaluate incident detection performance. Since it does not
directly measure the capability of AIDM in detecting individual incident patterns, a modified
version of the detection rate was introduced in Chapter 6.
Table 15 lists the modified detection rate (DRIP) and the conventional detection rate
(DR) calculated for the ANN models 3-F and 8-F and California and Minnesota algorithms
using the evaluation data. Model 3-F detected 95.25% of incident patterns while model 8-F
detected 95.45% of incident patterns correctly with no persistence check employed. However,
both ANN models detected every incident occurrence in the incident database used in the
evaluation process. Therefore, according to the definition of DR in equation 16 (Chapter 6),
DRs for both models were calculated to be 100%. Clearly, the incident detection performance
of the ANN models can only be differentiated using estimated the modified detection rate. If
one were to use the conventional detection rate, in this case, the DR cannot differentiate the
incident detection performance of the two models. The California and Minnesota algorithms
were not able to detect every incident occurrence in the data base. The
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Table 14. Evaluation Results for ANN Model and the Conventional Algorithms
Persistence or
Threshold Set No.

DRIP

FAR

Error Rate

MTD
(sec)

3-F
0

95.25%

0.98%

0.0206

116.7

1

95.22%

0.83%

-

140

2

95.18%

0.71%

-

170

3

95.13%

0.61%

-

200

8-F
0

95.43%

0.99%

0.0203

83.3

1

95.40%

0.61%

-

103.3

2

95.37%

0.30%

-

133.3

3

95.33%

0.01%

-

156.7

California Algorithm No. 8
1

80.82%

11.11%

0.1547

190.9

5

69.97%

10.76%

0.1758

197.1

7

46.44%

9.34%

0.2151

164.2

Minnesota Algorithm
1

88.93%

9.83%

0.1234

42.4

2

80.19%

7.99%

0.1249

47.6

3

58.40%

2.44%

0.1190

287.6

California algorithm detected the least number of incidents out of all the models, and had a
range of DRs for its different threshold sets as indicated in Table 15. On the other hand, the
Minnesota algorithm detected majority of incident occurrences using the thresholds listed.
Nevertheless, the Minnesota algorithm had trouble detecting the prolong continuation of

112

1 0 0 .00%

9 0 .0 0 %

8 0 .0 0 %

7 0 .0 0 %
California
M inneso t a

6 0 .0 0 %

3-F
8-F
5 0 .0 0 %

4 0 .0 0 %

3 0 .0 0 %

2 0 .0 0 %
0.00%

2.00%

4.00%

6.00%

8.00%

1 0 .0 0 %

1 2 .0 0 %

FAR %

Figure 33. Performance Envelope for ANN Models and Conventional Algorithms
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incident conditions in many occasions. Even though the algorithm could detect incidents
relatively faster, it seemed to have problems in detecting majority of incident patterns during
the latter part of each incident. From the Table 15, this scenario can be clearly observed with
DRIP ranging from 88.95% to 58.40% for the Minnesota algorithm with the three different
threshold sets. Even though the DR values for the California and Minnesota algorithm are
different for different threshold sets, DR values did not measure the true capability of
algorithm’s in detecting incident patterns. The major function of AIDMs are to detect whether
incident condition exists based on individual traffic flow patterns. Therefore, the efficiency
of AIDMs in performing this task can be better measured by using the modified detection rate
as the evidence indicated. In summary, DRIP is clearly a true measure of AIDM’s ability to
detect incident patterns during model development as well as in actual implementation than
the conventional detection rate.

7.5

Summary

The best models selected in each of the sixteen different architectures were put through an
evaluation test. Evaluation test was conducted to validate model performance with an
independent data set. The evaluation results indicated that model 3-F had the best overall
performance among the single hidden layer networks while model 8-F had the best overall
performance results among the double hidden layer networks.
The models 3-F and 8-F were used in comparative evaluation with the California and
Minnesota algorithms. Performance measures for the two algorithms were calculated using
the same evaluation data. Comparative analysis of the performance results suggested that
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Table 15. Comparative Evaluation of DRIP and Conventional DR
Persistence or
Threshold Set No.

DRIP

Conventional
DR

FAR

3-F
0

95.25%

100%

0.98%

1

95.22%

100%

0.83%

2

95.18%

100%

0.71%

3

95.13%

100%

0.61%

8-F
0

95.43%

100%

0.99%

1

95.40%

100%

0.61%

2

95.37%

100%

0.30%

3

95.33%

100%

0.01%

California Algorithm No. 8
1

80.82%

78.95%

11.11%

5

69.97%

68.42%

10.76%

7

46.44%

47.37%

9.34%

Minnesota Algorithm
1

88.93%

89.47%

9.83%

2

80.19%

89.47%

7.99%

3

58.40%

89.47%

2.44%

both ANN models outperformed the conventional algorithms. Of the two ANN models, the
model 8-F exhibited a better overall performance.
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CHAPTER 8
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1

Summary
Traffic incidents are a major contributor to the congestion that cause traffic delays in

freeway systems. To minimize traffic delays caused by incidents, traffic operational managers
focus on detecting incident conditions and dispatching incident management teams as quickly
as possible. During the past few decades, various conventional algorithms and ANN models
have been proposed to automatically detect incident conditions on freeways. Many of the
published AID systems posses several shortcomings. Even though the incidents affect the
traffic flow, only a combination of traffic flow variables have been used in many of these AID
systems as model inputs. These AID systems were trained to identify changes in traffic flow
data that represent incident conditions. However, changes in freeway geometry may also
affect the traffic flow. This effect may be represented in new models by including geometric
variables as additional inputs to reduce false alarms. In addition, the majority of AID models
based on ANN utilize simulated traffic data to train models. A conventional detection rate
was utilized in the AID systems as a performance measure to assess the detection capability.
However, the principle function of incident detection models is to identify whether an incident
condition exists for a given traffic pattern. To measure the true detection performance, a
modified ratio that utilize the number of detected incident patterns should be used instead.
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In this study, sixteen models based on two different ANN architectures (feed forward
and recurrent) were developed. Models in each architecture group had either single or double
hidden layers. Based on the ANN architecture (i.e., feed forward and recurrent architectures)
and the number of hidden layers (i.e., single or double layers) these models can be subdivided
into four different model groups. Each model group had a combination of traffic flow
variables and freeway geometric variables. Real life traffic data were used to train, test, and
evaluate each of the sixteen ANN models. Both upstream and downstream volume, speed,
and occupancy data for up to four consecutive time intervals were included in the model input
combination. The freeway geometric information (presence of entrance and exit ramps and
laneage expansions and mergers between the upstream and downstream) were also included
in the model input combination to test their affect on incident detection performance. Traffic
data gathered from I-880 during September 27 - October 29,1993 was used for model
training and testing, while traffic data gathered during February 16 - March 19, 1993 were
used for model evaluation. As the models were trained, testing data were used to ensure that
models were generalized and not overtrained. A modified detection rate based on detection
of incident pattens was introduced to measure the true capability of AID systems in detecting
incident patterns. Additionally, performance of the ANN models developed were evaluated
and compared with that of conventional algorithms such as the California and Minnesota
algorithms.
Performance measures such as DRIP, DR, FAR, and error rate of each model
developed were estimated at the end of training process. Single hidden layer feed forward
models 1-F through 4-F had a wider range for the error rate during the training process.
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Recurrent models 2-R, 3-R, and 4-R had similar DRIP and FAR values. Of the single hidden
layer models, the models 3-F and 3-R exhibited better performance during training within the
respective model architectures. In fact, both models had almost the same input feature sets
except for an added recurrent loop in the model 3-R.
The feed forward models with double hidden layers exhibited the lowest overall error
rate among all the models developed in this study. During the training, the best overall
performance was exhibited by model 8-F with double hidden layers. The model 8-F utilized
traffic flow and freeway geometric variables as model inputs. To be more specific, upstream
traffic variables up to t-4 time intervals, downstream traffic variables up to t-2 time intervals,
presence of entrance and exit ramps between two loop detector stations, and presence of lane
expansions and mergers between two loop detector stations were used as the model inputs.
The results of this research have demonstrated that new changes introduced to ANN inputs
can indeed improve freeway incident detection performance.
Two commonly used conventional algorithms, the California algorithm no. 8 and the
Minnesota algorithm, were also calibrated, using the same data used to train ANN models,
for performance comparison with the ANN models. A large number of threshold sets were
used in calibrating both algorithms. The best performing threshold sets were selected for
comparative evaluations.
The best ANN models in each of the sixteen model architectures selected during
training were used in the evaluation process. Model 3-F had the best performance among
single hidden layer networks and model 8-F had the best performance among double hidden
layer networks. During the comparative evaluations of the ANN models, the performance
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envelope for models 3-F, 8-F, California algorithm, and Minnesota algorithm reiterated that
model 8-F performances as observed during the training. Model 8-F detected more incident
patterns than any other AIDM with a lower false alarm rates. The comparison between the
modified detection rate (DRIP) and conventional detection rate (DR) for the models revealed
that DRIP provided the necessary performance index to compare incident detection capability
of different AIDMs.

8.2

Conclusions
A freeway traffic management system that quickly detects and removes incidents from

the freeway increases the safety of the travelers and decreases overall traffic delay.
Accordingly, an automated incident detection system is designed to ease the process of
identifying freeway incidents and expedite the disposal of emergency management team to the
scene much faster. In this research, ANN-based models were developed to accomplish this
task. The ANN models were trained and tested with actual field data. Developed ANN
models were validated using an independent data set.
Several important observations can be drawn from the analysis of training and
validation results. Freeway geometric features have proven to increase the model
performance. The modified detection rate introduced proved its potential to capture the true
ability of AIDMs to detect freeway incident patterns. ANN models have far superior
performance over the conventional algorithms. The ANN model 8-F with the input
combination of upstream traffic data up to t-4 time intervals, downstream traffic data up to
t-2 time intervals, and freeway geometric data was proven to yield the best incident detection
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performance during both training and validation processes. The false alarm rate of model 8-F
could still be reduced with three persistence checks. Therefore, the ANN model 8-F with
three persistence checks can be concluded to be a more practical model for traffic
management implementation. This is a model that a traffic operations manager can use not
only to detect the onset of an incident but the continuation of incident condition as well. The
modified detection rate depicts this in prospective.
From the ANN model development stand point, this study has also proved that double
hidden layer feed forward networks are better for freeway incident detection compared to
either the single hidden layer feed forward networks or both the single and double hidden
layer recurrent networks investigated.

8.3

Recommendations
Previous ANN models developed to detect freeway incidents were based on traffic

data gathered at inductive loop detector stations. The models were developed with the
assumption that the ANN models can detect the relationships among the traffic flow variables
and can detect sudden changes in traffic flow that are attributable to incidents. However
occasional it may be, sudden adverse weather conditions (such as a down pouring of rain or
snow) may also induce similar sudden changes in traffic flow such that ANN models may
incorrectly detect as incident conditions. To reduce these false alarms resulting from such
weather conditions, the weather information may be included as future model inputs. Future
highway infrastructure improvements may include weather sensors along freeways that can
transmit weather data for incident detection purposes. Further field testing with rich source
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of data from different locations may be required to study true transferability potential of the
8-F model.
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